), 徐烨超 浙江科技学院经济与管理学院, 杭州 310023
收稿日期:2020-03-02出版日期:2020-12-25发布日期:2020-10-26通讯作者:陈思静E-mail:chensijing@zust.edu.cn基金资助:* 国家自然科学基金项目(71701185);浙江省软科学项目(2020C35020)Warmth and competence: Impact of third-party punishment on punishers’ reputation
CHEN Sijing(), XU Yechao School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Received:2020-03-02Online:2020-12-25Published:2020-10-26Contact:CHEN Sijing E-mail:chensijing@zust.edu.cn摘要/Abstract
摘要： 第三方惩罚会对惩罚者的声誉产生显著影响, 然而就影响的方向而言, 现有文献给出了不同答案。上述问题的一个潜在原因是先前研究未能区分声誉的不同维度以及惩罚的不同动机与形式。通过将温暖-能力双维度结构引入惩罚者的声誉, 实验结果显示, 第三方惩罚从总体上降低了人们对惩罚者在温暖维度上的评价而提高了对其在能力维度上的评价。调节效应分析表明, 动机被归因为集体聚焦的惩罚进一步提升了其对能力的正面作用而减缓了对温暖的负面作用, 并且惩罚者的合作水平越高, 其动机被归因为集体聚焦的程度也越高。针对不同惩罚形式的进一步分析显示, 当惩罚动机被归因为个体聚焦时, 经济惩罚对温暖的负面作用显著高于社会惩罚, 而在集体聚焦的归因下经济惩罚对能力的正面作用显著低于社会惩罚。
图/表 16
表1变量描述性统计与相关系数
| 变量 | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 惩罚 | 0.24 | 0.29 | |||||
| 2 归因 | 3.88 | 1.78 | 0.06 | ||||
| 3 总钱数 | 54.80 | 8.34 | 0.03 | 0.04 | |||
| 4 被分配钱数 | 3.49 | 1.34 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.71** | ||
| 5 能力 | 3.07 | 1.86 | 0.58** | 0.48** | 0.10 | 0.15 | |
| 6 温暖 | 3.00 | 1.42 | -0.18 | 0.53** | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.24* |
表1变量描述性统计与相关系数
| 变量 | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 惩罚 | 0.24 | 0.29 | |||||
| 2 归因 | 3.88 | 1.78 | 0.06 | ||||
| 3 总钱数 | 54.80 | 8.34 | 0.03 | 0.04 | |||
| 4 被分配钱数 | 3.49 | 1.34 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.71** | ||
| 5 能力 | 3.07 | 1.86 | 0.58** | 0.48** | 0.10 | 0.15 | |
| 6 温暖 | 3.00 | 1.42 | -0.18 | 0.53** | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.24* |
表2层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(能力维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚 | 3.52 | 0.47 | 7.50 | 0.000 | 3.44 | 0.41 | 8.43 | 0.000 | 3.56 | 0.41 | 8.64 | 0.000 |
| 归因 | 0.47 | 0.08 | 6.09 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.46 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.52 | 0.000 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚×归因 | 1.19 | 0.22 | 5.41 | 0.000 | 1.26 | 0.22 | 5.63 | 0.000 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 被分配钱数 | -0.22 | 0.13 | -1.70 | 0.093 | ||||||||
| 总钱数 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 1.60 | 0.113 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.53*** | 0.65*** | 0.66*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.12*** | 0.01 | ||||||||||
表2层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(能力维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚 | 3.52 | 0.47 | 7.50 | 0.000 | 3.44 | 0.41 | 8.43 | 0.000 | 3.56 | 0.41 | 8.64 | 0.000 |
| 归因 | 0.47 | 0.08 | 6.09 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.46 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.52 | 0.000 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚×归因 | 1.19 | 0.22 | 5.41 | 0.000 | 1.26 | 0.22 | 5.63 | 0.000 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 被分配钱数 | -0.22 | 0.13 | -1.70 | 0.093 | ||||||||
| 总钱数 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 1.60 | 0.113 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.53*** | 0.65*** | 0.66*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.12*** | 0.01 | ||||||||||
图1归因对惩罚和能力之间关系的影响
图1归因对惩罚和能力之间关系的影响表3层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(温暖维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚 | -1.24 | 0.40 | -3.09 | 0.003 | -1.28 | 0.39 | -3.27 | 0.002 | -1.39 | 0.40 | -3.48 | 0.001 |
| 归因 | 0.42 | 0.07 | 6.32 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.69 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.66 | 0.000 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚×归因 | 0.52 | 0.21 | 2.48 | 0.015 | 0.45 | 0.22 | 2.09 | 0.039 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 被分配钱数 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 1.43 | 0.156 | ||||||||
| 总钱数 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -1.04 | 0.300 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.59*** | 0.63*** | 0.64*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.04* | 0.01 | ||||||||||
表3层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(温暖维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚 | -1.24 | 0.40 | -3.09 | 0.003 | -1.28 | 0.39 | -3.27 | 0.002 | -1.39 | 0.40 | -3.48 | 0.001 |
| 归因 | 0.42 | 0.07 | 6.32 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.69 | 0.000 | 0.38 | 0.07 | 5.66 | 0.000 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚×归因 | 0.52 | 0.21 | 2.48 | 0.015 | 0.45 | 0.22 | 2.09 | 0.039 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 被分配钱数 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 1.43 | 0.156 | ||||||||
| 总钱数 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -1.04 | 0.300 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.59*** | 0.63*** | 0.64*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.04* | 0.01 | ||||||||||
图2归因对惩罚和温暖之间关系的影响
图2归因对惩罚和温暖之间关系的影响表4温暖与能力的描述统计结果
| 合作 | 社会惩罚 | 经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 能力 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 低 | 无 | 无(N = 22) | 3.60 (1.55) | 3.17 (1.60) |
| 有(N = 22) | 3.36 (1.38) | 3.50 (1.44) | ||
| 有 | 无(N = 22) | 3.37 (1.44) | 3.44 (1.52) | |
| 有(N = 22) | 3.06 (1.66) | 3.24 (1.75) | ||
| 高 | 无 | 无(N = 22) | 4.89 (1.26) | 4.06 (1.60) |
| 有(N = 22) | 4.43 (1.26) | 4.30 (1.44) | ||
| 有 | 无(N = 22) | 4.92 (1.22) | 4.85 (1.23) | |
| 有(N = 22) | 4.47 (1.37) | 4.55 (1.52) |
表4温暖与能力的描述统计结果
| 合作 | 社会惩罚 | 经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 能力 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 低 | 无 | 无(N = 22) | 3.60 (1.55) | 3.17 (1.60) |
| 有(N = 22) | 3.36 (1.38) | 3.50 (1.44) | ||
| 有 | 无(N = 22) | 3.37 (1.44) | 3.44 (1.52) | |
| 有(N = 22) | 3.06 (1.66) | 3.24 (1.75) | ||
| 高 | 无 | 无(N = 22) | 4.89 (1.26) | 4.06 (1.60) |
| 有(N = 22) | 4.43 (1.26) | 4.30 (1.44) | ||
| 有 | 无(N = 22) | 4.92 (1.22) | 4.85 (1.23) | |
| 有(N = 22) | 4.47 (1.37) | 4.55 (1.52) |
表5二元三因素方差分析结果
| 来源 | 因变量 | 均方 | F | 显著性 | 偏η2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 修正模型 | 温暖a | 97.79 | 49.50 | 0.000 | 0.20 |
| 能力b | 71.85 | 30.96 | 0.000 | 0.13 | |
| 截距 | 温暖 | 22728.44 | 11504.62 | 0.000 | 0.89 |
| 能力 | 21341.39 | 9196.93 | 0.000 | 0.87 | |
| 合作 | 温暖 | 620.90 | 314.29 | 0.000 | 0.18 |
| 能力 | 429.52 | 185.10 | 0.000 | 0.12 | |
| 经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 47.89 | 24.24 | 0.000 | 0.02 |
| 能力 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.857 | 0.00 | |
| 社会惩罚 | 温暖 | 4.51 | 2.28 | 0.131 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 24.31 | 10.48 | 0.001 | 0.01 | |
| 合作×经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 2.94 | 1.49 | 0.223 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 0.74 | 0.32 | 0.572 | 0.00 | |
| 合作×社会惩罚 | 温暖 | 8.03 | 4.07 | 0.044 | 0.003 |
| 能力 | 23.27 | 10.03 | 0.002 | 0.01 | |
| 经济惩罚×社会惩罚 | 温暖 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.815 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 25.01 | 10.78 | 0.001 | 0.01 | |
| 合作×社会惩罚×经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.796 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.995 | 0.00 |
表5二元三因素方差分析结果
| 来源 | 因变量 | 均方 | F | 显著性 | 偏η2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 修正模型 | 温暖a | 97.79 | 49.50 | 0.000 | 0.20 |
| 能力b | 71.85 | 30.96 | 0.000 | 0.13 | |
| 截距 | 温暖 | 22728.44 | 11504.62 | 0.000 | 0.89 |
| 能力 | 21341.39 | 9196.93 | 0.000 | 0.87 | |
| 合作 | 温暖 | 620.90 | 314.29 | 0.000 | 0.18 |
| 能力 | 429.52 | 185.10 | 0.000 | 0.12 | |
| 经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 47.89 | 24.24 | 0.000 | 0.02 |
| 能力 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.857 | 0.00 | |
| 社会惩罚 | 温暖 | 4.51 | 2.28 | 0.131 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 24.31 | 10.48 | 0.001 | 0.01 | |
| 合作×经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 2.94 | 1.49 | 0.223 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 0.74 | 0.32 | 0.572 | 0.00 | |
| 合作×社会惩罚 | 温暖 | 8.03 | 4.07 | 0.044 | 0.003 |
| 能力 | 23.27 | 10.03 | 0.002 | 0.01 | |
| 经济惩罚×社会惩罚 | 温暖 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.815 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 25.01 | 10.78 | 0.001 | 0.01 | |
| 合作×社会惩罚×经济惩罚 | 温暖 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.796 | 0.00 |
| 能力 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.995 | 0.00 |
图3不同合作水平下社会惩罚对温暖的影响 注： *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 下同
图3不同合作水平下社会惩罚对温暖的影响 注： *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 下同
图4不同合作水平下社会惩罚对能力的影响
图4不同合作水平下社会惩罚对能力的影响
图5无/有社会惩罚时经济惩罚对温暖的影响
图5无/有社会惩罚时经济惩罚对温暖的影响
图6无/有社会惩罚时经济惩罚对能力的影响
图6无/有社会惩罚时经济惩罚对能力的影响表6变量描述性统计与相关系数
| 变量 | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 归因 | 3.67 | 1.61 | |||
| 2 温暖 | 4.46 | 1.43 | 0.16* | ||
| 3 能力 | 3.87 | 1.63 | 0.27** | 0.36** |
表6变量描述性统计与相关系数
| 变量 | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 归因 | 3.67 | 1.61 | |||
| 2 温暖 | 4.46 | 1.43 | 0.16* | ||
| 3 能力 | 3.87 | 1.63 | 0.27** | 0.36** |
表7层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(温暖维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式 | 0.80 | 0.18 | 4.54 | 0.000 | 1.92 | 0.43 | 4.42 | 0.000 | 1.85 | 0.44 | 4.25 | 0.000 |
| 归因 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 2.23 | 0.027 | 0.27 | 0.07 | 3.58 | 0.000 | 0.27 | 0.07 | 3.60 | 0.000 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式×归因 | -0.30 | 0.11 | -2.81 | 0.005 | -0.28 | 0.11 | -2.59 | 0.010 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 性别 | -0.20 | 0.17 | -1.15 | 0.253 | ||||||||
| 专业 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 1.15 | 0.252 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.10*** | 0.13*** | 0.14*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.03** | 0.01 | ||||||||||
表7层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(温暖维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式 | 0.80 | 0.18 | 4.54 | 0.000 | 1.92 | 0.43 | 4.42 | 0.000 | 1.85 | 0.44 | 4.25 | 0.000 |
| 归因 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 2.23 | 0.027 | 0.27 | 0.07 | 3.58 | 0.000 | 0.27 | 0.07 | 3.60 | 0.000 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式×归因 | -0.30 | 0.11 | -2.81 | 0.005 | -0.28 | 0.11 | -2.59 | 0.010 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 性别 | -0.20 | 0.17 | -1.15 | 0.253 | ||||||||
| 专业 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 1.15 | 0.252 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.10*** | 0.13*** | 0.14*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.03** | 0.01 | ||||||||||
图7归因对惩罚形式和温暖关系的调节作用
图7归因对惩罚形式和温暖关系的调节作用表8层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(能力维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式 | 0.70 | 0.20 | 3.54 | 0.000 | 1.18 | 0.48 | 2.46 | 0.015 | 1.16 | 0.49 | 2.40 | 0.017 |
| 归因 | 0.26 | 0.06 | 4.11 | 0.000 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.867 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.871 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式×归因 | 0.51 | 0.12 | 4.28 | 0.000 | 0.51 | 0.12 | 4.19 | 0.000 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 性别 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.65 | 0.513 | ||||||||
| 专业 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.937 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.12*** | 0.18*** | 0.18*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.06*** | 0.00 | ||||||||||
表8层次回归对主效应和调节效应的检验(能力维度)
| 效应 | M1 | M2 | M3 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | B | SE | t | p | |
| 主效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式 | 0.70 | 0.20 | 3.54 | 0.000 | 1.18 | 0.48 | 2.46 | 0.015 | 1.16 | 0.49 | 2.40 | 0.017 |
| 归因 | 0.26 | 0.06 | 4.11 | 0.000 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.867 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.871 |
| 调节效应 | ||||||||||||
| 惩罚形式×归因 | 0.51 | 0.12 | 4.28 | 0.000 | 0.51 | 0.12 | 4.19 | 0.000 | ||||
| 控制变量 | ||||||||||||
| 性别 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.65 | 0.513 | ||||||||
| 专业 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.937 | ||||||||
| R2 | 0.12*** | 0.18*** | 0.18*** | |||||||||
| ΔR2 | 0.06*** | 0.00 | ||||||||||
图8归因对惩罚形式和能力关系的调节作用
图8归因对惩罚形式和能力关系的调节作用参考文献 48
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