法律、监管与市场
席涛; 1:中国政法大学法和经济学研究中心 摘要(Abstract)：

市场有效率,也存在市场失灵。政府依据法律法规实施监管,同时也发生监管失灵。美国、欧盟和OECD颁布和发布监管影响分析指引的法律法规和规范性文件,规定评估法律法规和规章对经济、社会和环境的影响,建立中央层面的集中审核和协调的监管监管者机构,运用成本—收益分析方法衡量法律法规和规章的绩效。因此,市场经济不是要不要政府监管的问题,也不是政府监管多或者监管少的问题,而是监管什么、如何监管、用什么方法监管和如何衡量监管绩效的问题。基于法律经济学视角,这既是国会—总统(首相、总理、秘书长)—部长(行政机构和独立监管机构)的权力结构是否制衡和妥协的问题,又是颁布实施法律—行政法规(总统、首相、总理的行政命令)—规章的法律层级是否合法与有效的问题,核心是处理法律、监管与市场的关系。

关键词(KeyWords)： 监管影响评估;;经济社会环境;;成本—收益分析;;集中审核机构

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 北京市重点交叉学科“法律与经济”项目;;国家社会科学基金重点项目“保持经济稳定、金融稳定和资本市场稳定对策研究”(项目批准号08AJY037)的阶段性成果

作者(Author): 席涛;

Email:


参考文献(References)： ①Paperwork Reduction Act of1980,Public Law.No.96-511.②Elena Kagan,Presidential Administration,Harvard Law Review,Vol.114,No.8(2001),哈佛大学法学院院长Elena Kagan教授的这篇长文,以在克林顿执政时任总统顾问委员会国内政策副主任的经验,系统评析了总统管理模式。她认为,总统通过OMB和OIRA机制要求行政机构和独立监管机构(仅限于年度监管规划)实施总统行政命令的理念、原则、程序和方法。Elena Kagan于2010年10月离开哈佛大学法学院,就任最高法院大法官。①Peter L.Strauss,Overseer,or‘The Decider’?The President in Administrative Law,The George Washington Law Review,Vol.75,No.4(2007).哥伦比亚大学法学院Peter L.Strauss教授的1986、1997和2007年的这三篇文章,反映了他三十多年来关于三权分离相互制衡、行政程序法、总统行政管理和OIRA审核的理论观点的发展和演变轨迹。①Lawrence Lessig and Cass R.Sunstein,The President and The Administration,Columbia Law Review,Vol.94,No.1(1994),pp.1-123;Richard H.Pildes and Cass R.Sunstein,Reinventing the Regulatory State,The University of Chicago Law Review,Volume.62,No.1(1995),pp.1-130;Cass R.Sunstein,Congress,Constitutional Moments,and the Cost-benefit State,Stanford Law Review,Vol.48,No.2(1996),pp.247-309.芝加哥大学法学院Cass R.Sunstei教授在1994、1995和1996年连续发表了代表性和引用率最高的三篇文章,集中反映了他的三个观点:坚持总统式的集中控制;OIRA发挥审核与协调功能;监管影响分析和成本-收益分析是制定与评估法律和规章的重要程序和方法。Cass R.Sunstei教授的理论观点和法律经济学的研究方法,对美国学术界有很大影响。奥巴马于2009年任命Cass R.Sunstei为白宫OIRA主任。②Eric A.Posner,Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis:A Positive Political Theory Perspective,The University of Chicago LawReview,Vol.68,No.4(2001),pp.1137-1185.以及Eric A.Posner,Cost-Benefit Analysis as A Solution to A Principal-Agent Problem,Ad-ministrative Law Review,Vol.53,No.1(2001),pp.289-297.Eric A.Posner,Using Net Benefit Accounts to Discipline Agencies:A Thought Ex-periment,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Vol.150,No.5(May,2002),pp.1473-1488.芝加哥大学法学院Eric A.Posner教授的这三篇文章,用法律经济学的分析方法,论述了美国国会、总统和监管机构的委托-代理关系,强调了不完全和不对称信息对委托人与代理人的不同作用,成本-收益分析要求代理人提供监管机构对市场监管产生影响的基本信息。他认为,虽然法律经济学中的成本-收益分析、成本有效性分析和风险分析方法有缺陷,但在法律实证研究中,还没有发现一种替代它的方法。①Jonathan B Wiener,Better Regulation in Europe,Current Legal Problems,Vol.59,No.6(2006),pp.447-516.Wiener在这篇文章中,比较了美国、欧盟关于监管影响分析的法律规定、实施机制和分析方法。他认为,法律移植对各国法律改革起很大作用,学者在法律移植中发挥了重要作用,学者通过论文、国际会议和学校互访等方式,讨论一个相关的法律概念或法律框架,逐步达成一致。法律移植在欧盟更好的监管改革是从美国、欧盟成员国的英国、芬兰和荷兰,以及OECD等运用监管影响分析和成本-收益分析方法引入的一项制度。同时,他认为,相同的监管影响分析(RIA)的木桶,并不必然产生同样的红酒(p.453)。①Reagan,Executive Order12291:Task Force on Regulatory Relief,Federal Register Presidential Documents,Vol.46,FR13193(Feb.19,1981).②Clinton,Executive Order12866:Regulatory Planning and Review,Federal Register Presidential Documents,Vol.58,FR51735(Oct.4,1993).③George W.Bush,Executive Order13422:Further Amendment to Executive Order12866on Regulatory Planning and Review,FederalRegister Presidential Documents,Vol.72,No.14,FR2763(Jan.23,2007).④Obama,Executive Order13497:Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Regulatory Planning and Review(Jan.30,2009).⑤Obama,Regulatory Review,The President Memorandum of January30,2009,Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments andAgencies,Federal Register,Vol.74,No.21(Feb.3,2009)这八个问题是:一,关于信息和监管事务办公室和行政机构的关系;二,制定信息披露与透明性指引;三,鼓励公众参与行政机构监管过程;四,成本-收益分析的作用;五,重视分配、公正和相关问题对后代的利益;六,防止监管审查出现不必要的延误;七,行为科学在制定监管政策时的作用;八,通过监管程序达到公共目标的最佳工具。在这八个问题的征求意见中,截至2010年12月,共收到监管机构、研究机构、专家学者184封反馈意见。其中有支持和反对OIRA集中审核的意见,也有支持和反对成本收益分析的意见。⑥Obama,Executive Order13563:Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,Federal Register,Vol.76,No.14(Jan.21,2011).2011年2月2日,OIRA主任Cass R.Sunstein教授签发了备忘录,阐述了奥巴马13563号行政命令的基本原则,规定了行政机构实施13563号行政命令的重点要求。See,Executive Order13563,Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,From:Administrator Office of Infor-mation and Regulatory Affairs Cass R.Sunstein(Feb.2,2011).①European Commission,Impact Assessment,The Initial Guidelines were adopted in2002,COM(2002)276final.②EU Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making,sets a common framework for action by the European Commission,the Euro-pean Parliament and the European Council of Ministers,Official Journal of the European Union,Official Journal of the European Union,2003/C321/01.其中25-31条为“提高立法质量”规定,欧盟议会、理事会和委员会同意,运用影响评估程序、原则和方法,提高立法质量。影响评估主要评估所有法律对经济、社会和环境影响,包括立法前评估和立法后评估。这个法律奠定了欧盟影响评估的制度基础。③European Commission,Impact Assessment Guidelines,SEC(2005)791(15Jun2005),(15Mar.2006update).④European Commission,Impact Assessment Guidelines,SEC(2009)92(15Jan.2009).⑤European Commission,Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament,The Council,The European Economic andSocial Committee and The Committee of The Regions,Smart Regulation in the European Union,COM(2010)543final.Brussels,8.10.2010.①It entails identifying and evaluating expected economic,environmental and social benefits and costs of proposed public initiatives.Ameasure is considered to be justified where net benefits can be expected from the intervention.SEC(2009)92,p.44.①Commission of The European Communities,Proposal for a Council Regulation,Establishing a European Union Agency for FundamentalRights,COM(2005)280final;Establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights,Annex to the Impact Assessment Report,SEC(2005)849.②European Commission,Impact Assessment Board Report for2010,SEC(2011)126final,Brussels,24.01.2011.③OECD,Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation(1995).④OECD,Regulatory Impact Analysis:Best Practices in OECD Countries,OECD Publications,Printed In France(1997).⑤OECD,Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries:from Interventionism to Regulatory Governance,examines developments and challenges inthe application of regulatory policy(2002).⑥OECD,Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance(2005).⑦OECD,Building an Institutional Framework for Regulatory Impact Analysis(RIA):Guidance for Policy Makers,Version1.1(2008).⑧OECD,Reviews of Regulatory Reform,Regulatory Impact Analysis,A Tool For Policy Coherence(2009).⑨OECD,Regulatory Policy at the Crossroads:Towards a New Policy Agenda,OECD Conference,(28-29Oct.2010),Paris.OECD,Regulatory Policy and the Road to Sustainable Growth(Draft Report),(18Dec.2010),pp.1-91.①OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform China defing the boundary between the market and the state.OECD Printed in France(2009),pp.105-109.[1]George J.Stigler,The Theory of Economic Regulation,1971,Bell Journal of Economics and Management,Vol.2,No.1.[2]Peltzman,Sam,Towards a More General Theory of Regu-lation,1976,Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.19,No.2.[3]Glaeser,Edward,and Andrei Shleifer,The Rise of the Regulatory State,2003,Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.41,No.2.[4]Cass R.Sunstein,Congress,Constitutional Moments,and the Cost-benefit State,1996,Stanford Law Review,Vol.48,No.2.[5]Peter L.Strauss,Place of Agencies in Government:Sepa-ration of Powers and the Fourth Branch,1984,Columbia Law Review,Vol.84,No.3.[6]DeMuth,Christopher C.,and Ginsburg,Douglas H.,White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,1986,Har-vard Law Review,Vol.99,No.5.[7]Richard H.Pildes and Cass R.Sunstein,Reinventing the Regulatory State,1995,The University Of Chicago Law Review,Vol.62,No.1.[8]James F.Blumstein,Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President:An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues,2001,Duke Law Journal,Volume.51,No.3.[9]Elena Kagan,Presidential Administration,2001,Har-vard Law Review,Vol.114,No.8.[10]Steven Croley,White House Review of Agency Rulemak-ing:An Empirical Investigation,2003,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.70,No.3.[11]Nicholas Bagley,Richard Revesz,Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,2006,Columbia Law Review,Vol.106,No.6.[12]Lisa Schultz Bressman&Michael P.Vandenbergh,In-side the Administrative State:A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control,2006,Michigan LawReview,Vol.105,No.1.[13]Alan B.Morrison,OMB Interference with Agency Rule-making:The Wrong Way to Write A Regulation,1986,Harvard Law Review,Vol.99,No.5.[14]Peter L.Strausst and Cass R.Sunsteintt,The Role of The President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking,1986,Administrative Law Review,Vol.38,No.2.[15]Peter L.Strauss,Presidential Rulemaking,1997,Chica-go-Kent Law Review,Vol.72,No.4.[16]Peter L.Strauss,Overseer,or“The Decider”?The President in Administrative Law,2007,The George Washington Law Review,Vol.75,No.4.[17]Mathew D.McCubbins,Roger G.Noll,and Barry R.Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.”1987,Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,Vol.3.[18]Richard H.Pildes and Cass R.Sunstein,Reinventing the Regulatory State,1995,The University of Chicago Law Review,Volume.62,No.1.[19]Cass R.Sunstein,Congress,Constitutional Moments,and the Cost-benefit State,1996,Stanford Law Re-view,Vol.48,No.2.[20]John D.Graham,Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics,2008,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Volume157,Number2.[21]Richard A.Posner,Cost-Benefit Analysis:Definition,Justification,and Comment on Conference Papers,2000,Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.29,No.2.[22]Matthew D.Adler,Eric A.Posner,Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,1999,Yale Law Journal,Vol.109,No.2.[23]Eric A.Posner,Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis:A Positive Political Theory Perspective,2001,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.68,No.4.[24]Gary S.Becker,A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis,2000,Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.29,No.2.[25]Eric A.Posner,Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem,2001,Administrative Law Review,Vol.53,No.1.[26]Robert W.Hahn,and John A.Hird,The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:Review and Synthesis,1990,Yale Journal on Regulation,Vol.8.[27]Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling,Pricing the Priceless:Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Pro-tection,2000,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Vol,150,No.5.[28]Thomas D.Hopkins,Costs of Federal Regulation,1992,Journal of Regulation and Social Costs,Vol.2,No.1.[29]Henry S.Richardson,The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard,2000,Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.29,No.2.[30]David Copp,The Justice and Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis,1987,Theory and Decisions,Vol.23.[31]Lisa Heinzerling,Regulatory Costs of Mythic Propor-tions,1992,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.107,No.7.[32]Richard W.Parker,Grading the Government,2003,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.70,No.5.[33]Cass R.Sunstein,Cost-Benefit Default Principles,2001,Michigan Law Review,Vol.99.[34]Matthew D.Adler,Risk,Death and Harm:The Norma-tive Foundations of Risk Regulation,2003,Minnesota Law Review,Vol.87,No.5.[35]Amy Sinden,The Economics of Endangered Species:Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations,2004,Harvard Environmental Law Review,Vol.28.[36]Jane B.Baron&Jeffrey L.Dunoff,Against Market Ra-tionality:Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory,1996,Cardozo Law Review,Vol.17,No.3.[37]Jonathan B Wiener,Better Regulation in Europe,2006,Current Legal Problems,Vol.59,No.6.[38]W.Kip Viscusit,Regulating the Regulators,2006,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.63,No.4.