1宁波大学心理学系暨研究所, 宁波大学群体行为与社会心理服务研究中心, 浙江 宁波 315211;
2华东师范大学心理与认知科学学院, 上海 200062
收稿日期:2020-08-29出版日期:2022-01-25发布日期:2021-11-26通讯作者:尹军, E-mail: yinjun1@nbu.edu.cn; 段继鹏, E-mail: jipengduan@outlook.com基金资助:* 国家自然科学基金面上项目(31871091)、宁波大学研究生科研创新基金(IF2020042)资助The recognition of social intentions based on the information of minimizing costs: EEG and behavioral evidences
LIN Jing1, HUANGLIANG Jiecheng1, HE Yunfeng1, DUAN Jipeng2, YIN Jun11Department of Psychology, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China;
2School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200000, China
Received:2020-08-29Online:2022-01-25Published:2021-11-26摘要/Abstract
摘要： 与已有研究着重考察如何识别客体导向性意图(动作以物理对象为目标, 而不涉及其他人)不同, 本研究对人们如何识别社会性意图(动作以指向社会主体为目标以影响对方的交互行为)进行了探讨。基于两交互主体在整体层面应遵循效用最大化的分析, 提出当A协助B达成目标状态所需要的成本小于B单独实现该目标状态所需要的成本时(简称为成本最小化信息), 其可被识别为具有社会性意图。通过在B面前设置栅栏的方法操纵成本最小化信息, 以指示不同意图类型的脑电μ抑制程度、对不同变化的敏感性(辨别力)为指标, 对该假设进行了检验。结果显示, 相比客体导向性意图的控制条件(即A将目标物苹果放置在石头前), 当A将目标物苹果放置在被栅栏挡住的B前, 其动作可减少B单独获取该苹果的动作成本, 即符合成本最小化条件时, μ的抑制程度更高(实验1), 且对结构改变(某两个动画中充当相同角色的智能体互换)的辨别力更强, 但对角色交换(某个动画中两个智能体的角色交换)的辨别力更弱(实验3a);; 而当栅栏不存在时, 虽然A的运动路径与实验1相同, 但A将苹果放置在B前的成本大于B自身获取苹果的成本, 即不符合成本最小化条件, 条件间μ抑制的差异消失(实验2), 且对不同动作模式中变化的辨别相当(实验3b)。鉴于已有研究表明社会性意图所诱发的μ抑制强于客体导向性意图, 且人们对存在社会性意图的两个智能体间的结构改变更容易辨别, 而对角色交换不敏感, 故上述结果揭示, 两个个体的行为是否满足成本最小化影响人们对动作意图的识别, 支持成本最小化信息是社会性意图识别线索的观点。
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