第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应：基于社会规范的解释

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陈思静¹, 邢懿琳¹, 翁异静¹, 黎常²(

)

¹浙江科技学院经济与管理学院, 杭州 310023
²浙江工商大学工商管理学院, 杭州 310018

收稿日期:2020-06-08出版日期:2021-07-25发布日期:2021-05-24
通讯作者:黎常E-mail:lichang@zjgsu.edu.cn

基金资助:国家自然科学(71701185);浙江省软科学项目(2020C35020);浙江省自然科学(LQ18G010002)

Spillover effects of third-party punishment on cooperation: A norm-based explanation

CHEN Sijing¹, XING Yilin¹, WENG Yijing¹, LI Chang²(

)

¹School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
²School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2020-06-08Online:2021-07-25Published:2021-05-24
Contact:LI Chang E-mail:lichang@zjgsu.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 第三方惩罚对合作的维系可能来自经济功能或规范提示功能。先前研究没有区分这两种功能, 因而未能回答：当惩罚不足以影响违规收益时, 是否还能促进合作?实验1 (N = 252)发现即使第三方惩罚无法降低违规收益, 依然能抑制自利行为。实验2 (N = 179)发现受过惩罚的违规者在其后的独裁者博弈表现出了更高的合作水平。2(是否旁观惩罚)×2(旁观前后)设计的实验3 (N = 179)显示, 旁观惩罚后被试的合作水平显著高于旁观前, 也高于未旁观惩罚的被试。后两个实验中, 社会规范在惩罚与合作之间均起中介作用。这进一步证实惩罚对合作的促进在很大程度上是通过规范激活来实现的, 并存在两种溢出效应：惩罚抑制了曾经的违规者(纵向溢出效应)和旁观者(横向溢出效应)在新博弈情境下的自私行为。这两种溢出效应的发现补充了文献中占主导地位的经济学解释, 并为理解人类社会长时间、大规模的合作提供了新视角。

图/表 8

表1不同实验条件下合作与违规的收益

实验条件	${{\text{U}}_{\text{C}}}$	${{\text{U}}_{\text{D}}}$
对照组	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{2(10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}\text{+10)}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}$	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{20}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}}{\text{4}}-\text{1}$
高收益组	$\text{25+}\frac{\text{2(10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}\text{+10)}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}$	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{20}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}}{\text{4}}-{{\text{x}}_{\text{D}}}$
低收益组	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{2(10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}\text{+10)}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}$	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{20}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{D}}}$

表1不同实验条件下合作与违规的收益

实验条件	${{\text{U}}_{\text{C}}}$	${{\text{U}}_{\text{D}}}$
对照组	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{2(10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}\text{+10)}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}$	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{20}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}}{\text{4}}-\text{1}$
高收益组	$\text{25+}\frac{\text{2(10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}\text{+10)}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}$	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{20}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}}{\text{4}}-{{\text{x}}_{\text{D}}}$
低收益组	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{2(10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}\text{+10)}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}$	$\text{25}+\frac{\text{20}{{\text{x}}_{\text{C}}}}{\text{4}}-\text{10}{{\text{x}}_{\text{D}}}$

图1三组被试的合作水平注：*p < 0.05

图2惩罚组和对照组的规范激活与合作水平注：***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01

图2惩罚组和对照组的规范激活与合作水平注：***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01

表2中介效应的检验

变量	M₁(描述性规范)		M₂(命令性规范)		M₃ (合作行为)		M₄ (合作行为)
变量	系数	SE	系数	SE	系数	SE	系数	SE
常数	1.87^***	0.51	2.57^***	0.63	1.38^*	0.66	-0.17	0.62
惩罚	0.97^**	0.32	1.53^***	0.40	1.08^**	0.42	0.25	0.39
描述性规范							0.59^***	0.08
命令性规范							0.17^*	0.07
模型	R²	MSE	R²	MSE	R²	MSE	R²	MSE
模型	0.05	4.72	0.08	7.17	0.04	2.79	0.28	5.91

表2中介效应的检验

变量	M₁(描述性规范)		M₂(命令性规范)		M₃ (合作行为)		M₄ (合作行为)
变量	系数	SE	系数	SE	系数	SE	系数	SE
常数	1.87^***	0.51	2.57^***	0.63	1.38^*	0.66	-0.17	0.62
惩罚	0.97^**	0.32	1.53^***	0.40	1.08^**	0.42	0.25	0.39
描述性规范							0.59^***	0.08
命令性规范							0.17^*	0.07
模型	R²	MSE	R²	MSE	R²	MSE	R²	MSE
模型	0.05	4.72	0.08	7.17	0.04	2.79	0.28	5.91

图3描述性与命令性规范的中介作用注：***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

图3描述性与命令性规范的中介作用注：***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

表3二因素方差分析结果

来源	均方	F	显著性	偏η²
修正模型	75.98	10.95	0.000	0.09
截距	3129.38	451.16	0.000	0.59
轮次	107.07	15.44	0.000	0.05
分组	27.44	3.96	0.048	0.01
轮次×分组	93.42	13.47	0.000	0.04

表3二因素方差分析结果

来源	均方	F	显著性	偏η²
修正模型	75.98	10.95	0.000	0.09
截距	3129.38	451.16	0.000	0.59
轮次	107.07	15.44	0.000	0.05
分组	27.44	3.96	0.048	0.01
轮次×分组	93.42	13.47	0.000	0.04

图4对合作行为的多重比较

图5描述性规范的中介作用注：***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

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