夏佳奇^,,
何可^,,
张俊飚
华中农业大学经济管理学院/华中农业大学湖北农村发展研究中心 武汉 430070
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金青年项目71703051
国家自然科学基金重点项目71333006
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目15JZD014

详细信息

通讯作者:夏佳奇, 研究方向为农业资源与环境经济。E-mail:xjqgzyx163@163.com
何可, 研究方向为农业资源与环境经济。E-mail:hekework@gmail.com

中图分类号:X22

计量

文章访问数:420
HTML全文浏览量:2
PDF下载量:822
被引次数:0

出版历程

收稿日期:2019-05-31
录用日期:2019-08-29
刊出日期:2019-12-01

Effect of environmental regulations and village regulations on farmers' green production willingness: Taking the resource use of livestock and poultry waste of large-scale pig farmers as an example

XIA Jiaqi^,,
HE Ke^,,
ZHANG Junbiao
College of Economics and Management, Huazhong Agricultural University/Hubei Rural Development Research Center, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China
Funds: the National Natural Science Foundation of China71703051
the Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China71333006
the Major Project on Philosophy and Social Science Research of the Ministry of Education of China15JZD014

More Information

Corresponding author:HE Ke, E-mail: hekework@gmail.com

摘要
HTML全文
图(2)表(6)
参考文献(34)
相关文章
施引文献
资源附件(0)
访问统计

摘要
摘要:畜禽养殖污染是造成农业污染的重要因素，但现有环境法规作用有限，可能由于没有很好地融合当地的非正式制度。本文在研究环境规制对农户绿色生产意愿的基础上创新性地加入村规民约进行考虑，以湖北省规模养猪户为研究对象，运用结构方程模型分析了环境规制、村规民约对规模养猪户畜禽养殖废弃物资源化利用意愿的影响，探寻正式制度和非正式制度因素对规模养猪户资源化利用意愿的影响机制。研究结果表明：1）环境规制对规模养猪户的资源化利用意愿具有显著正向影响；2）村规民约对规模养猪户的资源化利用意愿具有显著正向影响；3）村规民约在环境规制对规模养猪户资源化利用意愿影响的过程中具有中介作用，具体表现为约束型环境规制借助规范性村规民约间接影响规模养猪户的畜禽养殖废弃物资源化利用意愿，引导型环境规制借助文化性村规民约间接影响规模养猪户的畜禽养殖废弃物资源化利用意愿。据此，本文提出政策启示：在乡村环境治理过程中政府应当完善环境规制、规范村规民约，并在实践中充分发挥两者的优点，使环境规制"合礼"化、村规民约"合理"化。
关键词:环境规制/
村规民约/
资源化利用意愿/
结构方程模型/
中介效应
Abstract:Pollution from pig breeding is a major contributor to agricultural pollution. However, existing environmental regulations have limited role, because it may not be well integrated into local informal system. This paper considers the environmental regulations to the farmers' willingness of green production and innovatively adds the village regulations, using large-scale pig farmers in Hubei Province as the research object as well as the structural equation model to study the influence of environmental regulations and village regulations on pig farmers' willingness to recycle livestock and poultry waste, and explore the mechanism of the influence of formal institutions and informal institutional factors on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers to use resources. The findings reveal that:1) environmental regulations have a significant positive effect on large-scale pig farmers' willingness; 2) village regulations have a significant positive effect on large-scale pig farmers' willingness; and 3) village regulations play an intermediary role in the impact of environmental regulations on large-scale pig farmers' willingness to use these resources. Restrictive environmental regulations have an indirect effect on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers to use these resources through normative village regulations, and guiding environmental regulations have an indirect effect on this willingness through cultural village regulations. Based on these findings, this study proposed the following policy implications. In the process of rural environmental governance, the government should improve the environmental regulations, standardize the village rules and regulations, and give full play to the advantages of both in practice, so as to make the environmental regulations "propriety" and the village rules and regulations "reasonable".
Key words:Environmental regulations/
Village regulations/
Resource utilization willingness/
Structural equation model/
Mediating effect

HTML全文


图1环境规制和村规民约对规模养猪户资源化利用意愿的影响效应研究模型
Figure1.Research model of the effect of environmental regulations and village regulations on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers' resource utilization


下载: 全尺寸图片幻灯片


图2环境规制与村规民约对规模养猪户资源化利用意愿影响的模型标准化路径系数
各缩写变量的含义见表 2。
Figure2.Model standardized path coefficient of environmental regulations and village regulations on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers' resource utilization
The meaning of each abbreviated variable is shown in the table 2.


下载: 全尺寸图片幻灯片

表1样本规模养猪户的个体特征描述
Table1.Description of individual characteristics of samples of large-scale pig farmers

项目 Project	类别 Category	样本量 Sample size	百分比 Percentage (%)
性别 Gender	男Male	403	98.29
	女Female	17	1.71
家庭总人数 Total number of families	0~3	68	16.59
	4~6	294	71.70
	7~8	40	9.76
	≥9	8	1.95
年龄Age	≤30	14	3.41
	31~40	78	19.02
	41~50	173	42.20
	51~60	118	28.78
	≥61	27	6.59
养猪年收入 Annual income of pigs (×104 )	≤100	360	87.80
	101~200	39	9.52
	201~300	5	1.22
	≥401	6	1.46
受教育水平(年) Education years (a)	0~6	94	22.93
	7~9	187	45.61
	10~12	116	28.29
	≥13	13	3.17
健康状况 Health status	不太好=1 No good=1	204	49.76
	一般=2 General=2	206	50.24
	比较好=3 Good=3	0	0

下载: 导出CSV
表2环境规制与村规民约各变量说明与描述性统计
Table2.Explanation and descriptive statistics of each variable of environmental regulations and village rules and regulations

潜变量 Latent variable	变量名称 Variable name	测量项目的含义与赋值 Meaning and assignment of measured index	均值 Mean	标准差 Standard deviation	最小值 Minimum value	最大值 Maximum value
环境规制 Environmental regulations	约束型规制(Rest) Restrictive regulations	开展监督、监管(Regu1) Carry out supervision and supervision	3.689	1.662	1	5
		制定与完善法规条例(Regu2) Formulate and improve regulations	3.692	1.536	1	5
	激励型规制(Ince) Incentive regulations	给予补贴(Ince1) Give subsidize	3.794	1.576	1	5
		给予用地、用水、用电优惠(Ince2) Give land, water, electricity discount	3.801	1.576	1	5
		税收优惠(Ince3) Tax discount	3.779	1.575	1	5
	引导型规制(Gui) Guiding regulations	营造产品公平竞争环境(Gui1) Create a fair competition environment for products	3.448	1.455	1	5
		村民会积极响应政府对环境保护等的宣传工作(Gui2) The villagers will actively respond to the government’s propaganda work on environmental protection	3.468	1.420	1	5
·		技术支持:帮助获得技术(Gui3) Technical support: helping to get technology	3.080	1.247	1	5
村规民约 Village regulations	规范性村规民约 (Norm) Normative village regulations	如果有人污染环境, 村里其他人会指责他(Norm1) If someone pollutes the environment, other people in the village will accuse him	3.669	1.613	1	5
		如果有人保护环境, 村里的其他人会表扬他(Norm2) If someone protects the environment, other people in the village will praise him	3.838	1.557	1	5
	文化性村规民约(Cul) Cultural village regulations	村里认为保护环境比获取经济利益更重要(Cul1) The village believes that protecting the environment is more important than obtaining economic benefits	3.465	1.506	1	5
		我和村民都关注整个村的集体利益(Cul2) I and the villagers are concerned about the collective interests of the entire village	3.577	1.539	1	5
资源化利用意愿 Resource utilization willingness	行为意向(Wil) Willingness	是否愿意利用畜禽粪便制沼气/生物天然气？(Wil1) Are you willing to use livestock and poultry manure to make methane/biogas?	0.659	0.475	0	1
		是否愿意利用畜禽粪便制有机肥？(Wil2) Are you willing to use livestock and poultry manure as organic fertilizer?	0.843	0.364	0	1
		是否愿意委托他人对畜禽粪便代为综合利用？(Wil3) Are you willing to entrust others to make comprehensive use of livestock and poultry manure?	0.716	0.451	0	1
控制变量 Control variable	性别 Gender	男性=1, 女性=0 Male=1, female=0	0.983	0.131	0	1
	年龄 Age	受访者实际年龄 Respondent’s actual age	47.766	8.715	25	70
	受教育水平 Educational level	受访者上学年限 Respondents’ school years (a)	8.652	2.614	0	16
	收入 Income	受访者养猪年收入 Respondents’ annual income from pigs (×104 )	53.445	78.671	2	945
	家庭总人数 Total number of families	受访者家庭总人数 Total number of respondents’ families	4.985	1.475	1	10
	健康状况 Health status	不太好=1, 一般=2, 较好=3 No good = 1, generally = 2, good = 3	1.502	0.501	1	2

下载: 导出CSV
表3环境规制、村规民约和规模养猪户资源化利用意愿各潜变量数据的信度与效度检验分析结果
Table3.Reliability and validity test results of environmental regulations, village regulations and the willingness of large-scale pig farmers' resource utilization

潜变量 Latent variable	观测变量 Observation variable	因子载荷 Factor load	Cronbach的α值 Cronbach’ α	组合信度 Composite reliability	平均提取方差 Average variance extracted
约束型规制 Restrictive regulations	Regu1	0.920	0.961	0.946	0.898
	Regu2	0.974
激励型规制 Incentive regulations	Ince1	0.965	0.984	0.984	0.953
	Ince2	0.984
	Ince3	0.980
引导型规制 Guiding regulations	Gui1	0.881	0.770	0.781	0.571
	Gui2	0.900
	Gui3	0.358
规范性村规民约 Nornative village regulations	Norm1	0.961	0.966	0.968	0.937
	Norm2	0.975
文化性村规民约 Cultural village regulations	Cul1	0.948	0.959	0.959	0.921
	Cul2	0.971
资源化利用意愿 Resource utilization willingness	Wil1	0.940	0.876	0.906	0.763
	Wil2	0.746
	Wil3	0.922
各缩写变量的含义见表 2。The meaning of each abbreviated variable is shown in the table 2.

下载: 导出CSV
表4环境规制与村规民约对规模养猪户资源化利用意愿影响的模型整体适配度评价及拟合结果
Table4.Evaluation of the overall fit degree of the model and the fitting results of environmental regulations and village regulations on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers' resource utilization

模型整体适配度检验 Model overall fitness test	统计检验量 Statistical test quantity	建议值 Suggested value	模型拟合指数 Model fitting index	拟合情况 Fitting
绝对指数 Absolute index	χ2/df	< 3.00	2.240	理想Perfect
	RMSEA	< 0.08	0.056	理想Perfect
相对指数 Relative index	NFI	> 0.9	0.965	理想Perfect
	RFI	> 0.9	0.957	理想Perfect
	IFI	> 0.9	0.981	理想Perfect
	TLI	> 0.9	0.976	理想Perfect
	CFI	> 0.9	0.980	理想Perfect
简约指数 Simple index	PCFI	> 0.5	0.784	理想Perfect
	PNFI	> 0.5	0.772	理想Perfect
χ2/df为卡方值与自由度的比值, RMSEA为近似误差均方根, IFI为增量拟合指数, TLI为非规范拟合指数, NFI、RFI、CFI分别为规范拟合、相对拟合、比较拟合指标, PCFI为简约比较拟合, PNFI为简约规范拟合指标。χ2/df is the ratio of chi-square value to degree of freedom, RMSEA is the approximate root mean square of errors, IFI is the incremental fit index, TLI is the nonstandard fitting index; NFI, RFI, CFI are the norm fit, relative fitting and comparing the fitting indexes; PCFI is a simple comparison and fitting, PNFI is a simple norm fitting index.

下载: 导出CSV
表5环境规制与村规民约对规模养猪户资源化利用意愿影响回归结果
Table5.Regression results of environmental regulations and village regulations on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers' resource utilization

路径 Path	非标准化系数 Non-standardized coefficient	标准误差 Standard error	临界比率值 Critical ratio value	标准化系数 Standardization coefficient	结论 Conclusion
Wil←Regu	0.053***	0.015	3.511	0.176***	H1:支持Support
Wil←Ince	0.105***	0.024	4.383	0.363***	H2:支持Support
Wil←Gui	-0.075***	0.024	-3.102	-0.215***	H3:不支持Not support
Wil←Norm	0.176***	0.028	6.274	0.612***	H4:支持Support
Wil←Cul	0.025**	0.009	2.908	0.080**	H5:支持Support
Norm←Regu	1.030***	0.030	34.169	0.992***	H6:支持Support
Cul←Gui	1.022***	0.040	25.510	0.914***	H7:支持Support
各缩写变量的含义见表 2。*、**、***分别表示P < 0.1、P < 0.01、P < 0.001。The meaning of each abbreviated variable is shown in the table 2. *, **, *** indicate P < 0.1, P < 0.01, and P < 0.001, respectively.

下载: 导出CSV
表6环境规制与村规民约对资源化利用意愿影响的直接和间接影响效应
Table6.Direct and indirect effects of environmental regulation and village regulations on the willingness of large-scale pig farmers' resource utilization

路径 Path	直接效应 Direct effect	间接效应 Indirect effect	总效应 Total effect
Wil←Regu	0.176	0.607	0.783
Wil←Ince	0.363	—	0.363
Wil←Gui	-0.215	0.073	-0.142
Wil←Norm	0.612	—	0.612
Wil←Cul	0.080	—	0.080
各缩写变量的含义见表 2。The meaning of each abbreviated variable is shown in the table 2.

下载: 导出CSV

参考文献(34)

[1]	陈锡文.环境问题与中国农村发展[J].管理世界, 2002, (1):5-8 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=glsj200201002 CHEN X W. Environmental problems and rural development in China[J]. Management World, 2002, (1):5-8 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=glsj200201002
[2]	HUANG J K, YANG G L. Understanding recent challenges and new food policy in China[J]. Global Food Security, 2017, 12:119-126 doi: 10.1016/j.gfs.2016.10.002
[3]	LAI C H, HU S W, WANG V, et al. Agricultural R&D, policies, (in)determinacy, and growth[J]. International Review of Economics & Finance, 2017, 51:328-341
[4]	温铁军.新农村建设中的生态农业与环保农村[J].环境保护, 2007, (1):25-27 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=hjbh200701008 WEN T J. Ecological agriculture and environmental protection in the construction of new countryside[J]. Environmental Protection, 2007, (1):25-27 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=hjbh200701008
[5]	王江, 吴维.产业污染向农村转移的法律防控研究[J].管理世界, 2016, (7):178-179 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=glsj201607018 WANG J, WU W. Study on legal prevention and control of industrial pollution transfer to rural areas[J]. Management World, 2016, (7):178-179 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=glsj201607018
[6]	虞祎, 张晖, 胡浩.地方环境规制、地区猪肉流通与污染天堂效应——基于引力模型的实证检验[J].农业技术经济, 2011, (11):84-90 http://www.cqvip.com/QK/90329X/201111/39967307.html YU Y, ZHANG H, HU H. Local environmental regulation, regional pork circulation and pollution heaven effect-an empirical test based on gravity model[J]. Journal of Agrotechnical Economics, 2011, (11):84-90 http://www.cqvip.com/QK/90329X/201111/39967307.html
[7]	李克强.以改革创新为动力加快推进农业现代化[J].求是, 2015, (4):3-10 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=663840443 LI K Q. Speeding up agricultural modernization with reform and innovation as the driving force[J]. Seeking, 2015, (4):3-10 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=663840443
[8]	潘丹.规模养殖与畜禽污染关系研究——以生猪养殖为例[J].资源科学, 2015, 37(11):2279-2287 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zykx201511019 PAN D. The relationship between intensification of livestock production and livestock pollution for pig-breeding[J]. Resources Science, 2015, 37(11):2279-2287 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zykx201511019
[9]	HE K, ZHANG J B, FENG J H, et al. The impact of social capital on farmers' willingness to reuse agricultural waste for sustainable development[J]. Sustainable Development, 2016, 24(2):101-108 doi: 10.1002/sd.1611
[10]	何可.农业废弃物资源化生态补偿[M].北京:人民出版社, 2019 HE K. Ecological Compensation for Agricultural Waste Resources[M]. Beijing:People's Publishing House, 2019
[11]	CHEN Y H, WAN J Y, WANG C. Agricultural subsidy with capacity constraints and demand elasticity[J]. Agricultural Economics, 2015, 61(1):39-49 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=ab27877821a68d82d05fb7686334e93c
[12]	PAN D. The design of policy instruments towards sustainable livestock production in China:An application of the choice experiment method[J]. Sustainability, 2016, 8(7):611 doi: 10.3390/su8070611
[13]	丁从明, 邵敏敏, 梁甄桥.宗族对农村人力资本投资的影响分析[J].中国农村经济, 2018, (2):95-108 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgncjj201802007 DING C M, SHAO M M, LIANG Z Q. The clan and human capital investment in rural China:An empirical study[J]. China Rural Economy, 2018, (2):95-108 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgncjj201802007
[14]	汪世荣. "枫桥经验"视野下的基层社会治理制度供给研究[J].中国法学, 2018, (6):5-22 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgfx201806001 WANG S R. On the supply of grassroots society governance system from the perspective of Fengqiao Experience[J]. China Legal Science, 2018, (6):5-22 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgfx201806001
[15]	高其才.通过村规民约的乡村治理——从地方法规规章角度的观察[J].政法论丛, 2016, (2):12-23 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-6274.2016.02.002 GAO Q C. The realization of village governance by village regulations and agreements-in the perspective of local law and local government regulations[J]. Journal of Political Science and Law, 2016, (2):12-23 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-6274.2016.02.002
[16]	周家明, 刘祖云.村规民约的内在作用机制研究——基于要素-作用机制的分析框架[J].农业经济问题, 2014, 35(4):21-27 ZHOU J M, LIU Z Y. Study on the internal mechanism of village regulations-based on the framework of factor-mechanism[J]. Issues in Agricultural Economy, 2014, 35(4):21-27
[17]	陈寒非, 高其才.乡规民约在乡村治理中的积极作用实证研究[J].清华法学, 2018, 12(1):62-88 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=qhfx201801004 CHEN H F, GAO Q C. An empirical study on the positive role of township regulations in rural governance[J]. Tsinghua University Law Journal, 2018, 12(1):62-88 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=qhfx201801004
[18]	赵玉民, 朱方明, 贺立龙.环境规制的界定、分类与演进研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2009, 19(6):85-90 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2009.06.016 ZHAO Y M, ZHU F M, HE L L. Definition, classification and evolution of environmental regulations[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2009, 19(6):85-90 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2009.06.016
[19]	薛伟贤, 刘静.环境规制及其在中国的评估[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2010, 20(9):70-77 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2010.09.013 XUE W X, LIU J. Environmental regulation and its evaluation in China[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2010, 20(9):70-77 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2010.09.013
[20]	POORTINGA W, SPENCE A, DEMSKI C, et al. Individual-motivational factors in the acceptability of demand-side and supply-side measures to reduce carbon emissions[J]. Energy Policy, 2012, 48:812-819 doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.06.029
[21]	郭庆宾, 刘琪, 张冰倩.环境规制是否抑制了国际R&D溢出效应——以长江经济带为例[J].长江流域资源与环境, 2016, 25(12):1807-1814 doi: 10.11870/cjlyzyyhj201612003 GUO Q B, LIU Q, ZHANG B Q. Does environmental regulation barrage international R&D spillovers:A case study of the Yangtze River Economic Belt[J]. Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin, 2016, 25(12):1807-1814 doi: 10.11870/cjlyzyyhj201612003
[22]	PAN D, ZHOU G Z, ZHANG N, et al. Farmers' preferences for livestock pollution control policy in China:A choice experiment method[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2016, 131:572-582 doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.04.133
[23]	袁平, 朱立志.中国农业污染防控:环境规制缺陷与利益相关者的逆向选择[J].农业经济问题, 2015, (11):73-80 http://www.cqvip.com/QK/96316X/201511/666662217.html YUAN P, ZHU L Z. Agricultural pollution prevention and control in China:Deficiencies of environmental regulation and the stake holder's adverse selection[J]. Issues in Agricultural Economy, 2015, (11):73-80 http://www.cqvip.com/QK/96316X/201511/666662217.html
[24]	张郁, 齐振宏, 孟祥海, 等.生态补偿政策情境下家庭资源禀赋对养猪户环境行为影响——基于湖北省248个专业养殖户(场)的调查研究[J].农业经济问题, 2015, 36(6):82-91 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=nyjjwt201506011 ZHANG Y, QI Z H, MENG X H, et al. Study on the influence of family endowments on the environmental behavior of massive pig farmers under the situation of ecological compensation policy:Based on the survey of 248 massive pig farmers in Hubei Province[J]. Issues in Agricultural Economy, 2015, 36(6):82-91 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=nyjjwt201506011
[25]	宾幕容, 文孔亮, 周发明.农户畜禽废弃物利用技术采纳意愿及其影响因素——基于湖南462个农户的调研[J].湖南农业大学学报:社会科学版, 2017, 18(4):37-43 http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-HNNS201704007.htm BIN M R, WEN K L, ZHOU F M. Farmers' willingness to adopt wastestock utilization technology and Its Influencing factors:based on the investigation of 462 farmers in Hunan[J]. Journal of Hunan Agricultural University:Social Science Edition, 2017, 18(4):37-43 http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-HNNS201704007.htm
[26]	钱海梅.村规民约与制度性社会资本——以一个城郊村村级治理的个案研究为例[J].中国农村观察, 2009, (2):69-75 http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-ZNCG200902009.htm QIAN H M. Village regulations and institutional social capital-taking a case study of village-level governance in suburban villages as an example[J]. China Rural Survey, 2009, (2):69-75 http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-ZNCG200902009.htm
[27]	周家明.乡村治理中村规民约的作用机制研究[D].南京: 南京农业大学, 2015 ZHOU J M. Study on the function mechanism of village regulations and rules in the rural management[D]. Nanjing: Nanjing Agricultural University, 2015
[28]	王振标.论村内公共权力的强制性——从一事一议的制度困境谈起[J].中国农村观察, 2018, (6):12-25 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgncgc201806002 WANG Z B. The binding force of the public power in villages:From the perspective of the "One Project One Discussion" system dilemma[J]. China Rural Survey, 2018, (6):12-25 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgncgc201806002
[29]	杨嵘均.论正式制度与非正式制度在乡村治理中的互动关系[J].江海学刊, 2014, (1):130-137 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-856X.2014.01.020 YANG R J. On the interaction between formal system and informal system in Rural Governance[J]. Jianghai Academic Journal, 2014, (1):130-137 doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-856X.2014.01.020
[30]	周力.产业集聚、环境规制与畜禽养殖半点源污染[J].中国农村经济, 2011, (2):60-73 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgncjj201102008 ZHOU L. Industrial agglomeration, environmental regulation and semi-point source pollution of livestock and poultry farming[J]. Chinese Rural Economy, 2011, (2):60-73 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=zgncjj201102008
[31]	林丽梅, 刘振滨, 杜焱强, 等.生猪规模养殖户污染防治行为的心理认知及环境规制影响效应[J].中国生态农业学报, 2018, 26(1):156-166 http://www.ecoagri.ac.cn/zgstny/ch/reader/view_abstract.aspx?file_no=20180117&flag=1 LIN L M, LIU Z B, DU Y Q, et al. Psychological cognition of pollution prevention of family-oriented scale pig breeders and environmental regulation influence effects[J]. Chinese Journal of Eco-Agriculture, 2018, 26(1):156-166 http://www.ecoagri.ac.cn/zgstny/ch/reader/view_abstract.aspx?file_no=20180117&flag=1
[32]	张广修.村规民约的历史演变[J].洛阳工学院学报:社会科学版, 2000, 18(2):25-29 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=lygxyxb-shkx200002007 ZHANG G X. Historical changes of village regulations and folk constitutions[J]. Journal of Luoyang Institute of Technology:Humanities, 2000, 18(2):25-29 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=lygxyxb-shkx200002007
[33]	方杰, 温忠麟, 吴艳.基于结构方程模型的多层调节效应[J].心理科学进展, 2018, 26(5):781-788 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=xlxdt201805003 FANG J, WEN Z L, WU Y. The analyses of multilevel moderation effects based on structural equation modeling[J]. Advances in Psychological Science, 2018, 26(5):781-788 http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/details/detail.do?_type=perio&id=xlxdt201805003
[34]	吴明隆.结构方程模型[M].重庆:重庆大学出版社, 2009 WU M L. Structural Equation Model[M]. Chongqing:Chongqing University Press, 2009