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代理人跨期消费决策下的有限合伙制序贯博弈均衡分析

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代理人跨期消费决策下的有限合伙制序贯博弈均衡分析 武晨1, 倪宣明2, 孙晓霞3, 沈佳瑜21 中国科学院自动化研究所, 北京 100190;
2 北京大学软件与微电子学院, 北京 100871;
3 东北财经大学数据科学与人工智能学院, 大连 116025 Sequential Game Equilibrium Analysis of Limited Partnership Based on Optimal Intertemporal Consumption Decision WU Chen1, NI Xuanming2, SUN Xiaoxia3, SHEN Jiayu21 Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
2 School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;
3 School of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China
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摘要本文基于委托代理理论研究了代理人跨期消费决策下有限合伙制和公司制的序贯博弈均衡.本文通过比较分析两种机制博弈均衡结果得出:代理人进行最优跨期消费决策时,仅有限合伙制能发挥激励作用从而改善道德风险问题.特别地,有限合伙制可在博弈区间趋于零时达到帕累托最优.通过与公司制的对比可知,公司制不是占优机制,博弈双方不会同时选择接受公司制,但在特定条件下有限合伙制占优于公司制,因而双方会选择接受有限合伙制,有限合伙制相比于公司制更具有激励优势.
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收稿日期: 2020-07-08
PACS:O29
基金资助:科技创新2030“新一代人工智能”重大项目(2018AAA0101001),国家自然科学基金(11801064)资助项目.

引用本文:
武晨, 倪宣明, 孙晓霞, 沈佳瑜. 代理人跨期消费决策下的有限合伙制序贯博弈均衡分析[J]. 应用数学学报, 2021, 44(4): 459-474. WU Chen, NI Xuanming, SUN Xiaoxia, SHEN Jiayu. Sequential Game Equilibrium Analysis of Limited Partnership Based on Optimal Intertemporal Consumption Decision. Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, 2021, 44(4): 459-474.
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[1]倪宣明, 武晨, 赵慧敏. 多期有限合伙制与公司制的道德风险和机制选择[J]. 应用数学学报, 2018, 41(1): 83-97.



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