多期有限合伙制与公司制的道德风险和机制选择

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多期有限合伙制与公司制的道德风险和机制选择倪宣明¹, 武晨², 赵慧敏³1. 北京大学软件与微电子学院, 北京 100871;
2. 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院, 北京 100190;
3. 中山大学管理学院, 广州 510275 Repeated Moral Hazard and Mechanism Selection Between Limited Partnership and Corporate System NI Xuanming¹, WU Chen², ZHAO Huimin³1. School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;
2. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
3. School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

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摘要本文基于委托代理理论和博弈论建立了有限合伙制与公司制下的多期道德风险模型，分析了委托人和代理人如何对这两种机制进行选择的问题.结论表明：两种机制下均存在道德风险问题，且在有限合伙制下因激励程度较高得到改善；两种机制相比较，公司制在特定条件下为博弈双方的最优选择，而有限合伙制只有在博弈双方地位不平等时才能达成.

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收稿日期: 2017-09-21

PACS:

O29

基金资助:国家自然科学基金青年（71303265）资助项目.

引用本文:

倪宣明, 武晨, 赵慧敏. 多期有限合伙制与公司制的道德风险和机制选择[J]. 应用数学学报, 2018, 41(1): 83-97. NI Xuanming, WU Chen, ZHAO Huimin. Repeated Moral Hazard and Mechanism Selection Between Limited Partnership and Corporate System. Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, 2018, 41(1): 83-97.

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