基于纵向差异化的双边软件平台竞争

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基于纵向差异化的双边软件平台竞争

窦一凡^1,2, 朱岩¹

1. 清华大学教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地-清华大学现代管理研究中心, 北京 100084;
2. 复旦大学管理学院, 上海 200433

Vertical differentiation and platform competition in two-sided markets

DOU Yifan^1,2, ZHU Yan¹

1. Research Center for Contemporary Management, Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
2. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

摘要:

输出: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)

摘要当前以苹果iOS和谷歌安卓为代表的软件平台与传统企业的经营模式的主要差异在于存在第三方的软件供应商通过平台进行销售。然而, 第三方软件提供商会怎样影响双边平台之间的竞争, 是现有研究涉及较少的内容。为了回答上述科学问题, 基于理论经济学的博弈分析方法, 针对2个存在纵向质量差异的软件平台建立了博弈模型。此外, 第三方软件提供商通过2个平台向消费者销售软件。基于上述假设, 依次求解了平台间的序贯博弈均衡以及第三方软件提供商的利润最大化问题。结果表明: 第三方软件提供商的存在使得多边软件平台间的竞争呈现以下特征: 1) 第三方软件提供商的存在会帮助低端平台扩大用户群; 2) 低端平台的质量改进在一定条件下会间接惠及其竞争对手; 3) 当平台间质量差异较大时, 低端的软件平台的最优策略是采用免费发放的策略。

关键词 ：双边市场,信息产品,序贯博弈均衡

Abstract：Software platforms such as Apple iOS and Google Android differ from the traditional platforms in terms of their revenue resources from the commission of the third-party software sales. However, the literature has paid little attention to the role of the third-party software providers in the platform competition. This paper employs a stylized game-theoretical model to analyze the platform competition between two vertically-differentiated software platforms in the presence of third-party software providers. The analysis uses both sequential game equilibrium and third-party software provider's profit maximization. The results suggest that: 1) the software market extends the market coverage of inferior platforms, 2) superior platforms may also benefit from quality improvements in inferior platform, and 3) some conditions can result in the inferior platform employing a zero-price strategy.

Key words：two-sided market information goods sequential game equilibrium

收稿日期: 2014-03-25 出版日期: 2015-09-08

ZTFLH:

F272.3

通讯作者:朱岩, 教授, E-mail: zhuyan@sem.tsinghua.edu.cnE-mail: zhuyan@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn

引用本文:

窦一凡, 朱岩. 基于纵向差异化的双边软件平台竞争[J]. 清华大学学报（自然科学版）, 2015, 55(6): 705-708.
DOU Yifan, ZHU Yan. Vertical differentiation and platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2015, 55(6): 705-708.

链接本文:

http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/或 http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2015/V55/I6/705

图表:

图1　定理1中博弈均衡的3个区间

图2　软件市场对于平台利润的影响

图3　低端平台质量对于平台博弈的影响

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