高明
经济系 助理教授


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清华大学经管学院经济系助理教授，2001年获清华大学经济学学士学位（清华大学2001届优良毕业生），2003年获清华大学数量经济学硕士学位，2010年获英国伦敦商学院经济学博士学位。
2018年获得清华大学经济管理学院经济系优秀教师奖，并曾两次获得清华大学经济管理学院教学优秀奖。
主要研究领域为产业组织理论，包括双边市场、平台定价、多产品定价、行为产业组织等理论。近期研究成果发表在International Economic Review等国际顶尖经济学期刊。曾经以及正在主持多项国家自然科学基金、教育部及清华大学科研项目。
讲授清华-MIT Global MBA项目核心课程《管理经济学（英文）》（获清华大学研究生精品课程）、学堂在线慕课《产业组织理论》、本科课程《产业组织理论（英文）》，以及本科课程《综合论文训练》。
目前的主要研究内容包括：对购物中心等多商家平台的会员收费及补贴策略的分析；对淘宝网、移动支付平台等混合双边平台企业最优定价问题的理论分析；对APP应用商店或媒体平台进行非价格歧视的机制分析与福利分析；对电信运营商等多产品企业定价问题的理论分析；以及分析商家如何利用巧妙定价从具有确定性偏向和现时偏向消费者的不同的精明程度之中获利等。
曾就职于长江商学院。
期刊论文（国际）
Ming Gao, “Platform Pricing in Mixed Two-sided Markets”, International Economic Review, 59-3, 2018.
Endorsed by National Natural Science Foundation of China, presented in 2015 at 6th Searle Center Annual Conference on Internet Search and Innovation (Northwestern University), 13th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC, Boston), 6th Workshop on the Economics of ICTs (University of Évora, Portugal), etc.
When a consumer can appear on both sides of a two-sided market, such as a user who both buys and sells on eBay, the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides. We develop a general model for such "mixed" two-sided markets, and show that a monopolist platform's incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand, which embody the bundling effect, and price-cost margins adjusted for network externalities, which incorporate "two-sidedness". The optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar Lerner formula.
Key Words: two-sided market, platform, bundling, price elasticity of demand
JEL Classification: D42, L11, L12.
Ming Gao, Mingzhi Li, "Strategies for Developing China's Software Industry", Journal of Information Technologies and International Development, 2003, 1(1), 61-73, MIT Press
近期会议论文（国际）
Ming Gao, “Multi-Seller Membership Pricing”,under review.
(an online appendix here)
Best Paper Award, China Industrial Economics Research Annual Conference 2015, also presented at 2017 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (CUHK), 2017 Royal Economic Society Conference (Bristol, UK), 2016 International Conference on Innovation and Industrial Economics (Nanjing, China), 2016 Workshop on Industrial Organization and Management Strategy (IOMS, HKUST, Hong Kong),2016 Annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC, Philadelphia), etc.
We study when and how the host organization of multiple sellers, such as a shopping mall, should subsidize or charge customers for access to its sellers if feasible. Each seller provides a different product, sets her own optimal price, and shares profit with the host proportionally to their bargaining power. We show that equilibrium subsidy is a multi-seller phenomenon, because a host with only one seller always charges customers. With multiple sellers, more bargaining power generally gives the host more incentive to subsidize customers, because it will be able to take larger shares of sellers' profit gains from increased demand. A less elastic demand for an individual seller, or a large cross-price elasticity of demand for the host also favors a subsidy versus a fee. Regardless of any demand-side factors, including price elasticities, consumer valuation distributions and cross-seller interdependencies, the host always charges a fee as long as the sum of the profit shares taken from individual sellers does not exceed 1. When this sum of profit shares does exceed a higher threshold, an equilibrium subsidy emerges. Therefore, large host organizations with more sellers and bigger bargaining power are more likely to subsidize customers, whereas small ones tend to charge fees. We also analyze welfare and find determinants of the host's incentive to offer purchase-contingent discounts on its membership fee.
Key Words:membership fee, subsidy, two-part tariff, multiproduct pricing, surplus sharing, bargaining power
JEL Classification: D42, L11, L12, L81.
Ming Gao, Travis Ng, “Non-Price Discrimination by a Prejudiced Platform”,under review.
Presented at2017 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (CUHK),2017 International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC, Boston), 2016 International Conference on Innovation and Industrial Economics (Nanjing, China), 2016 9th bi-annual Postal Economics Conference on E-commerce, Digital Economy and Delivery Services (Toulouse School of Economics, France), etc.
Recent lawsuits and anecdotal evidence suggest that some platforms discriminate against certain users through non-price practices, discouraging their participation without directly increasing revenue. We show that a monopolist two-sided platform with a prejudice against certain users - modeled as more costly to serve - chooses to discriminate only if the cost savings from reducing such users' participation outweigh the network benefits they create. Surprisingly, user surpluses may increase under discrimination because the platform often voluntarily lowers price(s) - sometimes on both sides - to attract other users. Therefore, tightening anti-discrimination policies for platforms can increase price and decrease welfare.
Key Words:discrimination; prejudice; regulation; policies on platforms; two-sided market; non-price strategiesv
JEL Classification: D42, L11, L12

译著
《国际经济学中的博弈论》，约翰•麦克米伦著，高明译，北京大学出版社2004年出版 (ISBN 7-301-06710-0/F.0724)
《经济学原理（第六版•下）》，卡尔•E. 凯斯、雷• C. 菲尔著，李明志、王斌、高明译，清华大学出版社2003年出版 (ISBN 7-302-06539-X/F.517)

“Multi-Seller Membership Pricing”
“An Economic Theory of App Review”(jointly with Travis Ng)
“Platform Pricing in Mixed Two-sided Markets”
“Profiting from Consumer Sophistication of Certainty Bias: Business and Policy Implications”, jointly with Jaimie Lien and Jie Zheng, endorsed project of the Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program
“A Platform Pricing Model for Mixed Two-Sided Markets”, jointly with Glen Weyl, Alexander White and Jie Zheng, endorsed project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China
“A Two-Sided-Market Approach to the Design of the Banking System”, jointly with Ping He, endorsed project of theTsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program
“Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: the Double Agency Problem”, jointly with Ping He and Yao Lu, endorsed project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China
“Probabilistic Selling to Certainty-Biased Consumers” (jointly with Qining Yu)
“Free Gift as a Profitable Pricing Strategy”
“Multiproduct Pricing with Network Effects”