Rights Offerings and Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

林自强教授 (会计学院)

方伟明教授 (金融学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12069

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0WOS source URL
Scopushttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0Scopus source URL

其它资讯

摘要We investigate rights issues and open offers in Hong Kong. We observe that the greater the severity of firms' management-agency problems, the more unfavourably shareholders tend to react, leading to more negative cumulative abnormal returns or rights forfeiture. Controlling shareholders do not forfeit rights, and may increase their percentage ownership at deep price discounts by underwriting rights offerings. Our results suggest that, although certain rights offerings can be described as value-enhancing, many other rights offerings closely resemble the expropriation activities of controlling shareholders. ? 2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

着者Fong W.-M., Lam K.C.K.
期刊名称Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
出版年份2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/014
月份1
日期1
卷号41
期次5-6
出版社Blackwell Publishing Inc.
出版地United Kingdom
页次773 - 79http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0
国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/03http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/06-686X
电子国际标準期刊号1468-5957
语言英式英语

关键词Corporate governance, Event study, Open offers, Rights issues