Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 刘民教授 (金融学系) |
| 刘民教授 (金融学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.02.002 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/10WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要Bribery, rather than firm performance, largely determines the extent to Which private firms access bank credit in China. Bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans. These firms also pay more in terms of bribes. Although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans, it does so only for loans originated by the big-four banks. For loans originated by smaller banks, performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access. Our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that Chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Chen YL, Liu M, Su J
期刊名称Journal of Banking and Finance
出版年份2013
月份7
日期1
卷号37
期次7
出版社Elsevier
页次2533 - 2545
国际标準期刊号0378-4266
电子国际标準期刊号1872-6372
语言英式英语
关键词Alternative governance mechanisms; Bank lending; Corruption
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS
