Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 林晨教授 (金融学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/25WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Lin C, Ma Y, Malatesta P, Xuan YH
期刊名称Journal of Financial Economics
出版年份2012
月份4
日期1
卷号104
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次1 - 22
国际标準期刊号0304-405X
语言英式英语
关键词Excess control rights; Ownership structure; Syndicated loans
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS
