Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 林晨教授 (金融学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.004 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/32WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Lin C, Officer MS, Zou H
期刊名称Journal of Financial Economics
出版年份2011
月份12
日期1
卷号102
期次3
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次507 - 525
国际标準期刊号0304-405X
语言英式英语
关键词Directors' and officers' liability insurance; Mergers and acquisitions
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS
