Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 林晨教授 (金融学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.012 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/81WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value. Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 countries during the 1996-2008 period, we find that the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner's control rights and cash-flow rights and investigate factors that affect this relation. Our results suggest that potential tunneling and other moral hazard activities by large shareholders are facilitated by their excess control rights. These activities increase the monitoring costs and the credit risk faced by banks and, in turn, raise the cost of debt for the borrower. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Lin C, Ma Y, Malatesta P, Xuan YH
期刊名称Journal of Financial Economics
出版年份2011
月份4
日期1
卷号100
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次1 - 23
国际标準期刊号0304-405X
语言英式英语
关键词Bank loans; Control-ownership wedge; Cost of debt; Excess control rights; Ownership structure
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS
