Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: International evidence
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

杨瑞辉教授 (金融学系)

郎咸平教授 (金融学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2009.33

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/21WOS source URL

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摘要Among firms listed in Western Europe and East Asia, when creditor protection is strong, the controlling shareholder trades off retaining control in bad states through pyramiding against retaining the upside in good states via leverage. This result might arise because the controlling shareholder uses both leverage and pyramiding to expand control of resources, but in different circumstances since they have different outcomes under downside shocks. When creditor protection is weak, the controlling shareholder no longer prefers pyramiding in bad states, because creditors will not be able to seize the firm in bad states. Therefore pyramiding and leverage are used together. Journal of International Business Studies (2010) 41, 88-104. doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.33

着者Faccio M, Lang LHP, Young L
期刊名称Journal of International Business Studies
出版年份2010
月份1
日期1
卷号41
期次1
出版社Palgrave Macmillan
页次88 - 104
国际标準期刊号0047-2506
电子国际标準期刊号1478-6990
语言英式英语

关键词capital structure; corporate governance; finance
Web of Science 学科类别Business; BUSINESS; Business & Economics; Management; MANAGEMENT