Ownership structure and financial constraints: Evidence from a structural estimation
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

林晨教授 (金融学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.06.001

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/20WOS source URL

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摘要This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders' control rights and cash-flow rights on firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994-http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2002 period, we find that the shadow value of external funds is significantly higher for companies with a wider insider control-ownership divergence, suggesting that companies whose corporate insiders have larger excess control rights are more financially constrained. The effect of insider excess control rights on external finance constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher degrees of informational opacity and for firms with financial misreporting, and is moderated by institutional ownership. The results show that the agency problems associated with the control-ownership divergence can have a real impact on corporate financial and investment outcomes. (C) http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

着者Lin C, Ma Y, Xuan YH
期刊名称Journal of Financial Economics
出版年份http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2011
月份11
日期1
卷号102
期次2
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次416 - 431
国际标準期刊号0304-405X
语言英式英语

关键词Financial constraints; Insider excess control rights; Ownership structure
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS