关键词:用地审批权配置;城市建设用地;面板数据;影响因素;中国 Abstract Including land policy,the expansion of urban land is affected by many factors,and land use impact of land use permit right allocations on urban land expansion is one of the important policy tool to control the conversion of land use and influence the growth of urban land. Since 1995,the allocation of land use permit rights in China has the power was shared by levels of governments;the power to permit land use was concentrated to the State Council; the provincial governments;the power owned by central government was nominally decentralized to provincial governments. In order to investigate the influence of land use permit right allocation on urban land expansion,we reviewed the reform process of land use approval system in China on the basis of the literature and estimated several model by using data from 231 prefecture level cities in China from 2000 to 2013. We found that in general,there is obviously regional effect on the growth of urban construction land when the power to permit land use were centralized to the State Council,and it is similar for the effect of the power being ‘nominally decentralized’ to provincial government. The power to permit land use being centralized to the provincial governments have effectively restrained the growth of urban construction land in eastern area and western areas,but no significant effect for other regions. The land supervision system has significantly slowed the growth of urban construction land at the national level.
随着经济增长和人口城市化水平提高,城市建设用地不断增加。在过去几十年中,中国城市人口比重逐步提高。2011年城市化率达到53.10% [1],城市人口数量超过农村人口:2013年全年国内生产总值高达59.52万元,比2000年增长近5倍[2];城市建设用地也快速增长,据相关报告数据显示2000-2013年的13年间,中国城市建设用地面积从45 520.00 km2增长至47 108.50km2,增长率约达3.49%[3] 。梳理已有文献可以发现,对城市建设用地的研究主要集中在对城市建设用地扩张驱动力的分析[4-8]以及财政收入增长[9,10]、经济增长[11-14]等因素对其影响的分析。就用地审批制度而言,为有效地保障粮食安全和管理城市建设用地增长,中国不断改革和完善用地审批制度、试图在中央与地方之间优化配置用地审批权力[15]。但是,从所掌握的文献来看,用地审批权配置对城市建设用地增长的影响尚未得到足够重视。 用地审批制度作为土地利用规划实施和土地用途管制的重要环节,试图通过层级之间权力的协调控制城市建设用地总量来遏制城市过度扩张,进而实现节约和合理利用土地资源。而国内关于土地审批制度的讨论大致集中在两个方面: (1)土地审批制度存在缺陷。不少研究指出中国土地审批程序存在操作繁琐费时的问题[16-19],这些弊端是造成土地资源浪费的重要原因[20]; (2)土地审批制度创新改革。有****提出要改变现有土地审批制度存在的缺陷则需要改变现行的土地审批结构框架,加强土地审批与土地利用总体规划的衔接[21],同时加强对城市建设用地审批工作的监督力度[22]。涉及用地审批的改革往往涉及在中央和地方各级政府之间优化配置审批权力,这就使得有必要分析过往用地审批权配置变化对城市建设用地增长的影响,为可能的制度完善提供参考。 自1986年颁布《土地管理法》[23]以来、中国不断调整用地审批权在各级政府之间的分配。1986年,全国人大常委会通过了《中华人民共和国土地管理法》[23],出于耕地保护的需要,中央适度上收了审批权限[21]。1998年,全国人大对《土地管理法》进行再次修订,进一步上收了用地审批权,土地征收、农用地转用的审批权上收至省级政府以及国务院[24]。2006年《关于做好报国务院批准建设用地审查报批有关工作的通知》[25]出台,社会各界普遍将其理解为一个放权过程[26],但国土资源部认为这只是建设用地审批权方式的调整,实际上是强化省级政府责任、并不存在下放问题。概括来说,从土地审批制度实施的不同阶段可以将审批权配置划分为三个时期 (1)地方分权期:1986-1998年,中国用地审批权实行分级限额审批制度。 (2)全面上收期:1998-2005年为用地审批权上收时期,在该阶段,用地审批权上收到省级政府和国务院,省级以下政府不再拥有农用地转用的权力。按照1998年修订的《土地管理法》,基本农田、基本农田以外耕地面积超过35hm2的,其他土地超过70hm2的由国务院审批;除上述情况的,征用土地由省级政府批准,并报国务院备案[21]”。其中,包括各直辖市、计划单列市和省、自治区人民政府所在地的城市,以及人口在50万以上的共84个城市的用地审批权归国务院[24]。 (3)“名义下放”期:2006-2013年,由国务院分批次审批土地征收和农用地转用改为由省级人民政府汇总一次申报,本文将该看似放权、实则强化省级责任的过程定义为“名义下放”期。各阶段用地审批权调整的有关法律法规和政策文件具体见表1。 Table 1 表1 表1土地审批权配置政策变化 Table 1Evolution of land use permit policy in China since 1986
文章将城市建设用面积作为被解释变量,考虑以下变量为解释变量: (1)用地审批政策。用地审批制度的改革是影响城市建设用地增长的重要因素。在研究时段内,用地审批权的配置大致可以划分为三个阶段:分级限额审批阶段、审批权上收阶段和审批权“名义下放”阶段。其中,审批权上收包括上收至省级政府和上收至国务院。鉴于此,本研究设置了两个政策变量来表达这两种审批权上收程度,即policy1和policy2。若2000-2005年土地审批权归至国务院,则政策变量policy1赋值为1、否则为0;若审批权收至省级政府,则policy2=1、否则为0;当policy1=policy2=0时,则表示为第一阶段的地方分权期;此外,2011-2013年新增国务院审批22个地级市,故2011-2013年这22地级市policy2=0。2006-2013年土地审批权调整“下放期”。在这阶段由国务院审批的地级市,不再分批次上报而是改为由省级政府汇总一次申报,即开启“省政府负责,国务院监管”的新模式,其实质审批权归属权仍在国务院。在此引入审批权名义下放政策变量policy3,若2006-2013年由国务院审批建设用地“下放”省级政府,则policy3赋值为1;此外,2011-2013年新增国务院审批的22个地级市 policy3=1,policy1=0。其余年份各个城市政策变量赋值为0,policy1、policy2预期符号为负。政策虚拟变量的赋值情况如表2。 (2)土地督察及“土地卫片执法检查”。研究表明土地督察制度的实施能减少土地违法[37],因此,推测“土地卫片执法检查”也可能对城市建设用地增长产生抑制作用。故引入政策变量dpolicy,vpolicy分别来表示土地督察和“土地卫片执法检查”。2006年建立了土地督察制度,由于条件限制无法获取每年土地督察具体地级市,这里假设土地督察制度实施对全国地级市制约作用是等效的,故将2007-2013年土地督察政策变量dpolicy赋值为1;2000-2013年实施“土地卫片执法检查”的地级市vpolicy赋值为1,其余年份地级市赋值为0,预期符号均为负。 (3)经济发展。经济发展通常用经济增长与产业结构变化来表达。不少研究表明经济增长与城市建设用地增长呈正向关系[6,14,38]。产业结构优化可提高建设用地利用效率,促进土地集约利用[39,40]。这里用地区生产总值和第二三产业占GDP比重两个指标来表征经济发展。为保证数据的可比性,对当年价地区生产总值进行了修正,修正方法如下: 实际地区生产总值=当年地区生产总值 100/CPI指数[6] 根据已有研究,预期地区生产总值和二三产业占GDP比重对建设用地增长具有正向影响。 (4)城镇人口数量。在衡量城市化水平时,通常有城镇常住口和非农业人口两种口径。城镇常住人口往往会形成有效的城镇建设用地需求[41],故本研究采用城镇常住人口表征城镇人口。其回归系数符号预期为正。 (5)固定资产投资。大量研究表明固定资产投资与城市建设用地存在正相关关系[6,42]。 为了消除异方差、使数据更加平稳,对建设用地面积、地区生产总值、固定资产投资、第二三产业比重和城镇人口变量分别取对数,经过变换的变量为lny、lngdp、lninvest、lnstr、lnpop。各变量定义和描述性统计如表3所示。 Table 2 表2 表2中国不同时段土地审批权变量赋值 Table 2Value for dummy variables of land use permit policy in China
时段
policy1
policy2
policy3
2000-2005年
1
1
0
2006-2010年
0
1
1
2011-2013年
0
p2(部分22城市)=0
p3(部分22城市)=1
新窗口打开 Table 3 表3 表3变量描述统计 Table 3Descriptive statistics of variables
3.1.1 全国层面模型估计结果 模型检验表明:建立固定效应模型Ui=0.58,F=4652.67,P=0.00,通过F检验;进行随机效应模型检验时,B-P检验的F值是4487.42,相应的P值为0.00,模型中包括时间效应;由于在Hausman检验中P=0.00,存在随机效应。综上检验结果所示,固定效应模型与随机效应模型均分别通过F检验和B-P检验,但是从Hausman检验结果观察来看,随机效应模型优于固定效应模型,故采用随机效应模型进行分析。对2000-2013年全国231个地级市的面板数据,运用Stata12软件进行回归分析,估计结果如表4所示。 Table 4 表4 表42000-2013年全国层面地级市随机效应模型估计结果 Table 4Estimation results of random effects model for prefecture-level cities in China from 2000 to 2013
3.2.1 土地审批权上收国务院和“名义下放”对建设用地增长的影响 从全国层面看,2000-2005年期间土地审批权上收国务院和2006-2013年间“名义下放”至省级政府对建设用地增长无显著影响;但从区域层面来看(表5),只在西部和东北部地区用地审批权上收国务院和“名义下放”至省级政府对建设用地增长具有抑制作用,在中部和东部则无显著影响。 Table 5 表5 表52000-2013年中国不同区域回归模型估计结果 Table 5Estimation results for prefecture-level cities by regions from 2000 to 2013
结合本研究结论,提出以下建议: (1)适度下放用地审批权、提高用地审批效率和地方用地灵活度,同时强化中央政府的监督,包括审批过程的监督和批后监管。 (2)差别化配置用地审批权,根据地区不同发展情况有策略地下放审批权。对于用地监管基础较好的地区,可以加大放权力度,而对于用地监管基础较差的地区,则应当维持当前用地审批权力配置格局。 (3)提升省级政府用地监管能力。对于用地监管基础薄弱的地区,采取相关能力建设项目、强化这些地区省级政府用地监管能力和监管效率。 The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
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