Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 张俊森教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.005 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/8WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper studies optimal pay-as-you-go social security with investment externalities, positive bequests and endogenous fertility. With an investment externality, a competitive solution without social security suffers from under-investment in capital and over-reproduction of population. We show the existence of time-consistent optimal social security that improves welfare by reducing fertility and increasing capital intensity. We also illustrate numerically that a small degree of this externality can justify the observed high ratios of social security spending to GDP. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Zhang J, Zhang JS
期刊名称Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
出版年份2007
月份11
日期1
卷号31
期次11
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
页次3545 - 3567
国际标準期刊号0165-1http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/8http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/89
电子国际标準期刊号1http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/879-1743
语言英式英语
关键词bequests; externality; fertility; social security; welfare
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
