Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李多哲教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/10WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要Two impatient players bargain over a pie of size one according to the infinite alternating-offers procedure. Players' payoffs depend not only on the outcome but also on the process of the bargaining. Specifically, they prefer impasse to any agreement that gives them lower discounted utility than would have been derived from accepting earlier offers. We characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium path, which consists of gradual concessions. The more patient players are, the longer it takes them to reach an agreement. When players become infinitely patient, the efficiency loss is substantial, yet the equilibrium division converges to the Nash solution. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
着者Li D
期刊名称Journal of Economic Theory
出版年份2007
月份9
日期1
卷号136
期次1
出版社ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
页次695 - 708
国际标準期刊号0022-0531
电子国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1095-7235
语言英式英语
关键词bargaining; delay; gradualism; history-dependence
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
