Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

张文瑞教授 (金融学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/9WOS source URL

其它资讯

摘要We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important for innovation, when free-riding among employees is weaker, when options are granted broadly to most employees, when the average expiration period of options is longer, and when employee stock ownership is lower. Further analysis reveals that employee stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

着者Chang X, Fu KK, Low A, Zhang WR
期刊名称Journal of Financial Economics
出版年份2015
月份1
日期1
卷号115
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次168 - 188
国际标準期刊号0304-405X
语言英式英语

关键词Corporate innovation; Employee compensation; Employee stock options; Risk-taking incentives
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; Economics