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基于博弈论的天然气管网恐怖袭击脆弱性分析

清华大学 辅仁网/2017-07-07

基于博弈论的天然气管网恐怖袭击脆弱性分析
黄丽达, 陈建国, 袁宏永, 王岩
清华大学 工程物理系, 公共安全研究院, 北京 100084
Terrorist attack vulnerability analysis of a natural gas network based on the Attacker-Defender game model
HUANG Lida, CHEN Jianguo, YUAN Hongyong, WANG Yan
Institute of Public Safety Research, Department of Engineering Physics, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

摘要:

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摘要近年来,全球范围内的恐怖袭击事件愈演愈烈,恐怖势力开始蔓延至各个国家的中心城市。天然气管网作为城市中承载危险品的运输网络,极易成为袭击目标。基于此,该文对天然气管网的恐怖袭击脆弱性进行研究。为描述恐怖袭击事件中袭击者和防御者之间的对抗关系,以某市天然气管网为例,基于博弈理论和网络的最大流模型,建立天然气网络的攻防博弈模型,求解博弈双方策略的Nash均衡解,分析双方的最优策略选择。通过Monte Carlo模拟,分析随机攻击和最优策略攻击的差异。结果表明:对于最优策略攻击,攻击管道数目不同时最优攻击目标也不同,因此无法简单地给出各条管道受到恐怖袭击威胁的优先级,此外,绝大多数随机攻击对系统造成的损失很小。该研究可以为政府部门防范恐怖袭击提供决策支持。
关键词 脆弱性,恐怖袭击,攻防博弈,天然气网络,最优化
Abstract:In recent years, terrorist attacks have become even more violent all over the world and terrorist forces have begun to spread to urban cities. Natural gas pipeline networks carrying hazardous materials in cities are easy targets for attacks. This study analyzes the vulnerability of a natural gas network to terrorist attacks. The adversary relationship between the attackers and defenders is modeled for a specfic natural gas transmission system using an attack-defense game based on game theory and the maximum-flow model of networks. The Nash equilibrium of the game strategy is used to analyze the optimal strategy choices of both parties. Monte Carlo simulations are used to compare the differences between random attacks and the optimal attack. The results show that the optimal attack targets differ for different numbers of pipelines, so it is impossible to rank the terrorist threat to pipelines. Additionally, most random attacks have little impact on the system. The conclusions in this paper can provide guidelines reference for government departments to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks.
Key wordsvulnerabilityterrorist attacksattacker-defendernatural gas networkoptimization
收稿日期: 2016-10-11 出版日期: 2017-06-22
ZTFLH:X959
通讯作者:袁宏永,教授,E-mail:hy-yuan@tsinghua.edu.cnE-mail: hy-yuan@tsinghua.edu.cn
引用本文:
黄丽达, 陈建国, 袁宏永, 王岩. 基于博弈论的天然气管网恐怖袭击脆弱性分析[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2017, 57(6): 609-613.
HUANG Lida, CHEN Jianguo, YUAN Hongyong, WANG Yan. Terrorist attack vulnerability analysis of a natural gas network based on the Attacker-Defender game model. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2017, 57(6): 609-613.
链接本文:
http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2017.26.027 http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2017/V57/I6/609


图表:
图1 某市天然气运输网络
图2 最坏攻击情况下天然气运输网络的最大流量变化
图3 典型的恐怖袭击脆弱性曲线
表1 不同的最坏攻击情况下攻击管道的编号
图4 随机攻击和最优策略攻击的最大流量对比
图5 随机攻击的结果


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