汉青论坛第318期：12月22日谢觐助理教授

本期主题: Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
摘要：
Trust between parties should drive the design of contracts: if parties did not trust each others' reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. principal-agent consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between parties staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable states of the world contracts cover increase after a drop in trust. The results hold for several text-analysis-based measures of completeness and do not arise when agents are also principals (shareholders) or in other falsification tests. Non-compete agreements, confidentiality and indemnification clauses, and restrictions to agents' actions are more likely to be added to contracts signed in the same locations, same industries, and same years after a negative shock to trust.

报告人：谢觐, 香港中文大学商学院助理教授
时间：12月22日（周二） 12：00
地点：明德主楼515教室
诚邀各位老师参加。如果您有兴趣，请于12月22日前回复邮件liu.zhe AT ruc.edu.cn或电话联系，我们将为您预留座位。联系人：刘喆 62510919。



报告人简介：
谢觐现于香港中文大学会计系任助理教授。谢觐于2005年获得中国人民大学金融学本科学位，2007年获得中国人民大学财金学院的金融学硕士学位，2014年获得香港科技大学会计学博士。谢觐的研究领域主要包括公司金融,宏观经济学和中国资本市场。