摘要:新常态下，我国的森林生态环境承载力已经达到或接近上限，森林资源存在乱砍乱伐现象和林区政府监管乏力问题，究其根源是缺乏森林保护和补偿的驱动机制。在中央政府投入大量物力和财力的同时，其他利益相关主体却存在不同利益诉求和行为导向冲突，跨区域森林生态补偿难以实现，因此利用演化博弈模型厘清森林生态环境保护与补偿行动中保护主体、受益主体和中央政府的关系，有助于突破跨区域森林生态保护补偿困境，形成良好的行动机制。分析主体功能区利益群体逻辑关系的基础上，构建保护地区政府和受益地区政府的演化博弈模型，分别研究未引入"约束-激励"机制和引入"约束-激励"机制下的主体行为特征及其影响因素，剖析不同情形地方政府间的博弈决策行为。研究结果表明，在未引入中央政府"约束-激励"机制的情况下，跨区域生态补偿无法实现，保护地区政府会通过权衡保护森林资源收益和机会成本进行策略选择，当保护森林资源的净收益为正时，即使没有受益地区生态补偿，保护地区政府仍然有足够的激励保护森林资源，当保护森林资源的净收益为负时，两类政府群体容易陷入森林生态治理的"囚徒困境"，而"约束-激励"机制的引入可以实现森林生态保护补偿的帕累托改进，通过中央政府惩罚、奖励金额的限制能够实现最优稳定均衡策略。



Abstract:Under the new normal, China's forest ecological environment bearing capacity has reached to the upper limit. Forest resources have the problem of suffer from deforestation and a lack of government supervision caused by the lack of a driving mechanism for forest protection and compensation. Although the central government has invested considerable resources, other stakeholders have different interests, which leads to conflict. Cross-regional forest ecological compensation is difficult to realize. However, the evolutionary game model can be used to clarify the relationship between the protective body, the beneficiary subject, and the central government for the protection and compensation of forest ecological environments. This will aid in breaking through the dilemma of ecological protection and compensation and forming effective action mechanisms. In the present study, we developed an evolutionary game model representing the interactions between the protecting regional government and the benefiting regional government based on an analysis of the logical relationships between interest groups in functional areas. We analyzed the game decision-making behavior among local governments under different scenarios with and without the "constraint-motivation" mechanism. The results indicated that cross-regional ecological compensation cannot be achieved without the introduction of the central government's "restriction-incentive" mechanism. In the scenario without the restriction-incentive mechanism, the protecting government chose its strategy by comparing the income from and cost of protecting forest resources. When the net income from protecting forest resources is positive, the regional government still has sufficient incentive to protect forest resources, even if there is no ecological compensation. When the net income of protecting forest resources is negative, the two government groups are likely to fall into the Prisoner's Dilemma of regulatory strategies. The introduction of the "restriction-incentive" mechanism can realize Pareto efficiency of forest ecological protection compensation, and an optimal stable equilibrium strategy can be achieved through the limitation of punishments and rewards from the central government.





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