Welfare changes and disparities among farmers before and after renting out farmland with government-dominated farmland transfer in the Guanzhong-Tianshui Economic Zone
LIAOPeiling, ZHAOJian, XIAXianli College of Economics & Management, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, China 通讯作者:通讯作者:夏显力,E-mail:xnxxli@163.com 收稿日期:2017-09-25 修回日期:2018-03-30 网络出版日期:2018-07-20 版权声明:2018《资源科学》编辑部《资源科学》编辑部 基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY137)教育部人文社会科学项目(15YJA790068) 作者简介: -->作者简介:廖沛玲,女,广东肇庆人,硕士生,主要研究方向为农村与区域发展。E-mail:Liaopuiling@163.com
关键词:农户福利;土地流转;政府主导;博弈论组合权重;关天经济区 Abstract To promote farmland large scale management and rural economic development, government-dominated farmland transfer has been a significant mode of farmland transfer in modern China. Farmland is known as the most important livelihood asset of farmer, and its transfer will have a great influence on welfare changes and disparities among farmers. According to 659 samples from the Guanzhong-Tianshui Economic Zone, we built a farmers’ welfare index system based on the thought of Sen’s function and capacity approach. We used fuzzy evaluation method and combination weight based on game theory to measure welfare changes. We used indexes of Gini and Theil to analyze welfare disparities for farmers. We found that after farmland transfer, sampled farmers’ welfare levels are modestly improved, though the increase is not significant. Specifically, sampled farmers’ welfare levels increase from 0.432 to 0.467. Rather, it is still below the median level 0.5. Economic condition, social security, living condition, employment and development are improved to varying degrees, but psychology and health declines. The total welfare disparities and welfare disparities within groups become narrow. Welfare disparities between groups show little change. There are differences in role positioning, process management and regulatory guarantee in government-dominated farmland transfer, which means that the effect of equal distribution of welfare within groups on the Tianshui area is greater than that for the Guanzhong area. We suggest improvements to government-dominated farmland transfer to comprehensively enhance farmers’ welfare, reduce welfare disparities within groups and develop these two areas simultaneously.
Keywords:farmers’ welfare;farmland transfer;government-dominated;combination weight based on game theory;Guanzhong-Tianshui Economic Zone -->0 PDF (4189KB)元数据多维度评价相关文章收藏文章 本文引用格式导出EndNoteRisBibtex收藏本文--> 廖沛玲, 赵健, 夏显力. 农地转出前后农户福利变化及差异研究——以关天经济区政府主导型农地流转为例[J]. 资源科学, 2018, 40(7): 1354-1364 https://doi.org/10.18402/resci.2018.07.04 LIAOPeiling, ZHAOJian, XIAXianli. Welfare changes and disparities among farmers before and after renting out farmland with government-dominated farmland transfer in the Guanzhong-Tianshui Economic Zone[J]. RESOURCES SCIENCE, 2018, 40(7): 1354-1364 https://doi.org/10.18402/resci.2018.07.04
随着福利经济学的发展,研究****分别从功利或效用[21]、功能和能力[20]、快乐与幸福[22]等方面对福利进行诠释及衡量。其中,森对福利经济学中以功利或效用衡量福利提出批判,认为福利的构成不仅应包括经济层面,还应包括人们需要的各个方面[20]。为此,森提出功能和能力理论,并指出可通过考察一个人的功能与能力进而评价其福利状况。其中,功能反映一个人已经获得的福利,能力则反映一个人能够获得福利的潜在机会。在实证研究中,由于功能和能力难以被直接观察,因此对福利的评估通常建立在对功能性活动评估的基础上。森的功能和能力理论提倡福利是多维的,避免了只关注效用的片面性,具有较强的可操作性。基于森的功能和能力理论,研究****从多个维度考察农户的功能性活动,进而评价其福利状况[23,24,25]。 根据现实观察,政府主导型农地流转具有政府偏好性、转入主体多元化、流转规模扩大化、流转契约长期化等特点[16]。由此,政府偏好性意味着政府可能对转出区域进行统一规划、统一基础设施及配套设施建设等,农户的住房条件、居住环境、生活便利性可能会发生变化。同时,转出区域的整体发展亦可能带动农户发展机遇的提升。转入主体多元化意味着农地转出前后农户的社会交往情况将会发生改变,其心理与生理上都需作出调整与适应。随着承包经营权在较长时间内转出,农户家庭农业收入将受到影响,基于收益最大化考虑,农户将对家庭劳动力进行重新配置,做出外出务工或留乡创业等决策[26],此时家庭的外出务工比例及非农收入都将发生变化。同时,随着非农就业机会的增多与正式制度保障的完善,土地不再是唯一的就业与养老手段[27],在此背景下,土地的基础生活保障功能可能弱化。可见,政府主导型农地流转背景下,农户多个方面都将发生变化。因此,基于森的功能与能力理论从多个维度测定农户福利变化则更为准确。 研究框架见图1。 显示原图|下载原图ZIP|生成PPT 图1农地转出前后农户福利变化及差异研究框架 -->Figure 1Research framework of farmers’ welfare changes and disparities before and after farmland transfer -->
2.2 福利评价指标构建及数据的描述性统计
基于上述分析,参考相关文献以及兼顾农户的功能和能力,本文选取经济状况、社会保障、居住条件反映其已经获得的福利,选取就业及发展、心理与健康反映其能够获得福利的潜在机会,农户福利评价指标构建及数据的描述性统计如表1所示。 Table 1 表1 表1农户福利评价指标构建及数据描述性统计 Table 1Evaluation system of farmers’welfare and descriptive statistics of data
将主观权重向量和客观权重向量代入公式(5)并进行归一化处理,可测算出主观权重系数 为0.801,客观权重系数 为0.199。将求得的权重系数与主、客观权重代入公式(6),可得各指标的博弈论组合权重。将博弈论组合权重代入公式(7)、公式(8),可得政府主导型农地流转下,农地转出前后农户的福利状况(见表2)。 Table 2 表2 表2农地转出前后农户福利状况的模糊评价 Table 2Fuzzy evaluation on farmers’ welfare state before and after farmland transfer
农地转出前后农户福利的洛伦兹曲线变化并不明显,本文将直接求取两类福利差异指数反映农地转出前后农户福利的差异状况。将农户个体福利隶属度从小到大依次排列,计算农户福利累计百分比与农户人口累计百分比,两者分别对应洛伦兹曲线的纵轴和横轴,将得到的XY散点用平滑的曲线连接起来,即为农户福利的洛伦兹曲线。运用Excel添加趋势线,可得到洛伦兹曲线的拟合曲线方程f(x)。 转出前的拟合曲线方程为: (14) 转出后的拟合曲线方程为: (15) 将公式(14)、公式(15)代入公式(9),将农户福利隶属度代入公式(10)–公式(13),可求得福利差异指数(见图3)。 显示原图|下载原图ZIP|生成PPT 图3农地转出前后农户福利差异指数 -->Figure 3Welfare gap indexes of farmers before and after farmland transfer -->
如图3所示,政府主导型农地流转下,关天经济区农户福利差异的基尼系数 从0.081下降至0.074,表明农地转出后农户之间的福利差距在缩小。农地转出前后,基尼系数均接近0.1,表明关天经济区农户福利分配处于相当平等的状态。 与基尼系数相比,泰尔指数具有空间可分解性,可将福利总差距分解为区间福利差距与区内福利差距。通过对泰尔指数的计算,可见关天经济区农户福利总差距、区内福利差距均呈现出不同程度的缩小。表明政府主导型农地流转在一定程度上促进了关天经济区农户的整体发展(区内福利差距缩小),并且关中区域与天水区域发展现状相近(区间福利差距不明显)。然而,福利总差距在转出前后均主要由区内福利差距构成,且区内福利差距均远大于区间福利差距,说明在看似公平的福利分配下(基尼系数接近0.1),区内福利分配的“贫富差距”仍然存在且不可忽视。 此外, 下降幅度大于 ,说明较关中区域而言,政府主导型农地流转对天水区域农户福利平等分配的作用更大。对此,可能的原因是:与关中区域相比较,天水区域更倾向于外包开发,契约形式更为规范,租金支付更倾向于一次性付清,流转纠纷更少,流转期限更为合理(见表3)。具体而言:相比于政府开发,外包开发资金供应更为灵活,不容易受到地方财政的约束;相比于其他契约形式,书面合同更为规范,更有利于保障双方权益,尤其是处于弱势方的转出户的权益;一次性付清租金可用作农户人力资本投入、创业投资、生活质量提升的资金来源;流转纠纷越少,农户投入到生计改善的人力物力越多;流转期限越合理,越有利于保证农地的托底作用得以有效实现。 Table 3 表3 表3关中区域、天水区域政府主导型农地流转比较 Table 3Comparison of government-dominated farmland transfer between Guanzhong and Tianshui (%)
基于以上结论,本文得到如下研究启示: (1)地方政府应对正式制度与非正式制度对转出户的保障功能给予重视:一方面,通过制定针对性的保障措施,不断完善正式制度保障,促进转出户从基础生活保障向社会保障、商业保障转变[42],确保其脱离部分或全部农地后有完善的正式制度保障相对接;另一方面,对于资源禀赋效应较强的转出户,应加快落实其农地确权结果,进一步稳定其农地承包权,重点监管其农地经营权用途,保证其返乡务农或年纪较大时仍能拥有承包经营权,并在流转契约到期后仍能正常使用农地,确保农地的托底作用得以有效发挥。 (2)地方政府应建立专门的帮扶资金库和帮扶机构,依据转出户现实情况的需要,制定针对性的帮扶措施;依据转出户福利水平的高低,制定帮扶的优先次序,全面促进转出户经济状况、社会保障、居住情况、就业及发展、心理与健康的可持续发展,进一步缩小区内福利差距。同时,成立针对政府主导型农地流转的监管部门,明晰政府在农地流转过程中的引导者、管理者、服务者和规划者角色,避免政府越位、缺位、错位现象的发生;因地制宜地制定出符合转出区域实际情况的流转政策,避免区间福利差距扩大。 (3)适度引入市场机制,促进转出区域开发资金供应的多样化;促进土地流转市场的规范化与有序化,保障处于弱势方的转出户的权益;充分尊重农户的流转意愿,探索合理的流转期限;显化政府主导型农地流转对区内福利差距的缩小作用,促进区域共同发展。 The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
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