关键词:地方政府;农地流转;转入规模;粮食单产;影响;江苏省 Abstract Under the background of realizing farmland large scale management and agricultural modernization, local government-dominated farmland transfer is becoming more and more common in China. Local government-dominated farmland transfer will have an important impact on farmers’ transfer scale and grain production. Based on survey data from 152 large-scale grain production farmers in Jiangsu, we used multiple regression to test the impact of local government-dominated farmland scale transfer on farmers’ transfer scale and grain production. We comparatively analyzed the different effects on grain production between farmer's spontaneous transfer and government-dominated farmland scale transfer. We found that compared with spontaneous transfer by farmers, local government-dominated farmland transfer can reduce transaction costs and through comprehensive land management, financial subsidies and other policy tools encourage farmers to turn in more farmland and expand scale demands. Local government-dominated farmland large scale transfer has a significant negative impact on grain production. Compared with spontaneous transfer, the grain production under government-dominated is lower. Therefore, in the process of promoting the transfer of rural farmland, local governments should take into account public interests and food security and promote moderate scale transfer. They should also strengthen the service function, improve security supervision measures, give full play to transfer services, supervision and regulation, and bring farmland transfer and scale management in line with the goal of increasing grain production.
Keywords:local government;farmland transfer;transfer scale;grain yield;impact;Jiangsu -->0 PDF (3117KB)元数据多维度评价相关文章收藏文章 本文引用格式导出EndNoteRisBibtex收藏本文--> 王雪琪, 邹伟, 朱高立, 曹铁毅. 地方政府主导农地流转对农户转入规模与粮食单产的影响——以江苏省五地市为例[J]. 资源科学, 2018, 40(2): 326-334 https://doi.org/10.18402/resci.2018.02.09 WANGXueqi, ZOUWei, ZHUGaoli, CAOTieyi. The impact of local government-dominated farmland transfer on farmer’s transfer scale and grain yield in five cities in Jiangsu[J]. RESOURCES SCIENCE, 2018, 40(2): 326-334 https://doi.org/10.18402/resci.2018.02.09
表3(见第331页)中模型1回归结果显示,地方政府主导农地流转对农户转入面积具有显著的正向影响,说明与农户自发流转相比,地方政府主导能够激励农户流入更多土地。主要原因有: (1)为实现自身计划与目标,地方政府主导农地流转具有追求大规模的偏好[5]。农地流转制度创新是各个参与主体在现有制度下追求自身利益最大化的互动博弈过程[25,26],地方政府作为农地流转市场的参与主体之一,为了凸显政绩,实现政治和经济目标,具有推动大规模流转倾向,会针对不同农户灵活运用利益驱动、组织动员以及规则公平等策略,通过土地综合整治平整土地、减少细碎化、改善基础设施、出台激励政策与财政补贴等惠农项目方式激励农户转入农地,扩大了农户的规模需求[5,8,27]。 (2)在农地流转过程中,信息搜集、协商谈判以及合同签订等都会产生交易成本,地方政府拥有强大的资源动员能力,与农户接触较多,并且当选的村干部往往具有号召力,综合素质较高,那么地方政府作为农地流入主体,在信息收集、选择交易对象以及解决纠纷上能够有效地降低交易成本;而农户自发流转因流转信息不完全、产权不完整导致农户之间信息搜集困难,转入户一对多的谈判需要反复协商,交易成本较高,根据农户行为理论可知,在面对多种可行的方案时,农户将选择使其效益最大化的方案[28],此时,与农户自发流转相比,转入户与地方政府一对一的谈判交易有效地降低其交易成本,因此,在地方主导模式下,农户会扩大规模需求。 其他控制变量中,户主性别、家庭年收入以及抚养比对转入面积有显著的正向影响。户主性别显著说明在中国农村地区,男性户主在家庭决策中占有重要地位;家庭年收入越高,对于农业生产的投入资金越充足,越倾向转入土地;家庭抚养比越高,农户家庭负担较大,越容易转入土地提高收入。此外,流转租金与家庭承包地面积对农户转入土地的影响不显著。 Table 3 表3 表3地方政府主导农地流转对农户转入规模影响模型的估计结果 Table 3The estimation result that the influence model of local government leading farmland transferring on farmers' turning in scale
地方政府主导农地流转通过政策工具以及改变土地利用条件影响粮食产量,而粮食产量变化也可能会引起地方政府主导农地流转,直接将地方政府主导变量引入模型可能会面临反向因果关系导致的内生性问题;但由于政府主导农地流转更多是执行上级政府发展现代、高效农业,实现规模经营、增减挂钩的行政命令,并非基于农户个体粮食生产行为做出的决策,因此,可以认为模型中不存在反向因果关系导致的内生性问题。 表4中模型2—模型3回归结果显示,地方政府主导农地流转在显著水平1%上对粮食单产有负向影响,说明与农户自发流转相比,地方政府主导下农户的粮食单产较低。可能的原因有:一是地方政府主导下农地与自发流转农地质量存在差异,一些地方政府主导农地流转过程中,通过土地综合整治项目平整土地,减少细碎化,完善配套基础设施等方式吸引规模经营者的同时,短期内造成土壤表层肥力流失,耕作层破坏,导致种粮大户粮食减产[29],据调研数据显示,地方政府主导模式下,32%的大户流转土地时进行了土地综合整治。二是地方政府主导农地流转与农户自发流转下农户经营规模存在差异,因地方政府主导农地流转在流转与招租过程中,多是采用集中流转路径,设置准入条件,放大了农户规模需求,导致农户经营规模过大,经营能力与规模的不匹配会造成农户规模报酬以及单产水平的下降;而自发流转模式下农户流转时是渐进式小型化流转,依据经营能力而选择的最适经营规模,在经营过程实现了生产要素的同步配置[8]。由表1可知,地方政府主导下农户的劳动、机械与资本投入与农户自发流转模式下农户投入不存在显著差异,但地方政府主导下农户的经营面积46.896hm2,是自发流转近2倍,远超过江苏省适度规模经营20hm2上限。 Table 4 表4 表4地方政府主导农地流转对粮食单产影响模型的估计结果 Table 4The estimation result that the influence model of local government leading farmland transferring on grain yield
基于以上研究结论,本文得到以下政策启示: (1)明确政府角色,推动适度规模流转。地方政府在推动农地流转过程中,应兼顾公共利益和粮食安全,因地制宜地制定科学合理的流转规划,控制流转面积,合理引导经营主体适度规模经营,防止过度规模化。 (2)强化政府服务功能,完善保障监管措施。在农户自发流转过程中充分发挥服务、监督和规范作用,多途径、多形式考察规模经营者的种植能力,设置准入条件,监管经营者种植行为,引导农地流转市场要素流动,确保粮食安全。 The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
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