专题一：逆向选择与道德风险1. Adverse Selection (Screening)［1］*Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983), "Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information", Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 123-156.［2］Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1986), "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms", Journal of Political Economy 94(3).2. Moral Hazard［1］*Holmstrom, B. (1979), "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.［2］*Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: Special Issue.等专题二：动态的逆向选择和道德风险［1］*Hart, O. and J. Tirole (1988), "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics", Review of Economic Studies 55: 509-540.［2］Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1988), "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", Econometrica 56: 1153-1175.等专题三：多代理人下的道德风险［1］Demski, J. and D. Sappington (1984), "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents", Journal of Economic Theory 33: 152-171.［2］*Green, J. and N. Stokey (1983), "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts", Journal of Political Economy 91: 349-364.等专题四：不完全合同理论［1］*Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.［2］Salanie, B., Ch 7.等专题五：扩展：合同理论基础、公司金融与创新［1］Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (2003), "Transferable Control", mimeo, Harvard.［2］*Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997), "Real and Formal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Political Economy 105: 1-29.等

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课程考核分三部分：出勤占30%，课堂表现占30%，期末考核占40%。每个专题将精讲部分经典文献，学生将被要求在每堂课之前简要写出该文献要解决的主要问题、采用的方法、结论及其经济含义等，以作为课堂表现的依据。