教学大纲 专题一:逆向选择与道德风险1. Adverse Selection (Screening)[1]*Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983), "Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information", Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 123-156.[2]Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1986), "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms", Journal of Political Economy 94(3).2. Moral Hazard[1]*Holmstrom, B. (1979), "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.[2]*Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: Special Issue.等专题二:动态的逆向选择和道德风险[1]*Hart, O. and J. Tirole (1988), "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics", Review of Economic Studies 55: 509-540.[2]Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1988), "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", Econometrica 56: 1153-1175.等专题三:多代理人下的道德风险[1]Demski, J. and D. Sappington (1984), "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents", Journal of Economic Theory 33: 152-171.[2]*Green, J. and N. Stokey (1983), "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts", Journal of Political Economy 91: 349-364.等专题四:不完全合同理论[1]*Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.[2]Salanie, B., Ch 7.等专题五:扩展:合同理论基础、公司金融与创新[1]Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (2003), "Transferable Control", mimeo, Harvard.[2]*Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997), "Real and Formal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Political Economy 105: 1-29.等 |