Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: a Nash-bargaining analysis
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

张俊森教授 (经济学系)

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数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00165-8

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Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/10WOS source URL

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摘要This paper explores the implications of inter-generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household. Adopting a Nash-bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points, it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child than to a single child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public goods and because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption. Such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

着者Suen W, Chan W, Zhang JS
期刊名称Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
出版年份2003
月份9
日期1
卷号52
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
页次133 - 146
国际标準期刊号0167-2681
电子国际标準期刊号1879-1751
语言英式英语

关键词dowry; inter-generational transfers; intra-household allocation
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS