Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李宏彬教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00225-2 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/4WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper theoretically explains how the government, in the face of asymmetric information, can use the option of reversing privatization and the buy-out price as a screening mechanism to elicit private information from the manager about the firm's value. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Li HB
期刊名称Economics Letters
出版年份2003
月份2
日期1
卷号78
期次2
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次267 - 271
国际标準期刊号0165-1765
电子国际标準期刊号1873-737http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/4
语言英式英语
关键词option; privatization; reverse privatization; screening
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
