Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李宏彬教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/336WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual performance. We interpret these empirical findings as evidence that China uses personnel control to induce desirable economic outcomes. Our study adds some basic evidence to a growing theoretical literature emphasizing the role of political incentives of government officials in promoting local economic growth. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Li HB, Zhou LA
期刊名称Journal of Public Economics
出版年份2005
月份9
日期1
卷号89
期次9-10
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
页次1743 - 1762
国际标準期刊号0047-2727
语言英式英语
关键词economic performance; personnel control; political turnover
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
