Two-sided matching, who marries whom? And what happens upon divorce?
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香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

庄太量教授 (经济学系)

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摘要Conventional two-sided matching game is a one-period game. In this note, we contribute to the existing literature by examining a multi-period two-sided matching problem allowing for the possibility of a divorce. We assume that the matching game is played repeatedly and the payoff matrix changes over time. It is shown that the rule of divorce will affect the equilibrium of a marriage game. An empirical implication of our result is that a country with a well-developed financial market will have a better marital outcome as compared to a less-developed country.

着者Chong T.T.-L.
期刊名称Economics Bulletin
出版年份2006
月份http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/12
日期http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
卷号4
期次http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
出版社Economics Bulletin
出版地United States
国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1545-292http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
语言英式英语