Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 杜巨澜教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2006.11.001 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/4WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要Since the source of funds for banks is mainly deposits, banks have difficulty raising funds to refinance their balance sheets when a substantial portion of their loan portfolio is in default. Intrinsically, banks face hard budget constraints and are subject to market discipline. However, governments with both the resources and the incentives to bail out failing banks may lead to soft budget constraints for banks. Consequently, banking regulation, especially bank capital adequacy regulation, becomes an important institutional solution to the resulting instabilities. Our theory predicts that countries having a larger fiscal capacity are more prone to applying soft budget constraints to failing banks; thus, these governments impose tighter bank capital adequacy regulations to minimize the adverse impact of moral hazard arising from the soft budget constraint on banks. We provide cross-country empirical evidence to support this prediction.
着者Du JL, Li DD
期刊名称Journal of Comparative Economics
出版年份2007
月份3
日期1
卷号35
期次1
出版社ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
页次108 - 135
国际标準期刊号01http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/47-5967
电子国际标準期刊号1095-7227
语言英式英语
关键词banking regulation; capital structure of banks; soft budget constraint
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
