Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 黄锦就教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) ○○@http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2$@○○ |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2WOS source URL
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摘要We show that the predictions of long-run behavior under the evolutionary process are highly sensitive to the addition and elimination of strictly dominated strategies. In particular, for the best response dynamics [cf. Kandori, M., Rob, R., 1995. Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications. J. Econ. Theory 65 (http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2), 383-414] we prove that for any symmetric normal form game, any strict Nash equilibrium can be selected as the unique long-run equilibrium by appropriately adding only one single strategy which is strictly dominated by all original strategies. Moreover, if we further assume instantaneous adjustment, then any convex combination of strict Nash equilibria with rational number weights can be realized as the long-run distribution by appropriately adding strictly dominated strategies. (C) http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
着者Kim C, Wong KC
期刊名称GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
详细描述To ORKTS: This is an output for the RGC Project No CUHK461http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2/05H
出版年份http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2010
月份1
日期1
卷号68
期次1
出版社Elsevier
页次http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/24http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2 - http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/254
国际标準期刊号0899-8http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/256
语言英式英语
关键词Best response process; Dominated strategies; Long-run equilibrium
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
