A multilateral telephone bargaining game
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

李多哲教授 (经济学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.034

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0WOS source URL

其它资讯

摘要This paper studies a multilateral bargaining game with unanimity rule. Offers and responses are communicated through private telephone conversations, and they are never revealed to all players. With a plausible restriction on beliefs, we obtain a unique perfect public equilibrium. (C) 2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/01http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

着者Li DZ
期刊名称Economics Letters
出版年份2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/01http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0
月份7
日期1
卷号1http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/08
期次1
出版社Elsevier
页次43 - 45
国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0165-1765
电子国际标準期刊号1873-7374
语言英式英语

关键词Multilateral bargaining; Private offers and responses; Unique equilibrium
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS