Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李多哲教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.008 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0WOS source URL
Scopushttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0Scopus source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper studies a bilateral bargaining game in which one party can suspend the game indefinitely. If suspension is costless, multiple equilibria arise; if suspension is costly and subject to a budget constraint, a unique equilibrium with immediate agreement is obtained. ? 2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/011 Elsevier B.V.
着者Li D.
期刊名称Economics Letters
出版年份2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/011
月份8
日期1
卷号112
期次2
出版社Elsevier BV
出版地Netherlands
页次155 - 157
国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0165-1765
电子国际标準期刊号1873-7374
语言英式英语
关键词Bargaining, Budget constraint, Sanction, Suspension
