Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李多哲教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.10.008 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/3WOS source URL
Scopushttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/3Scopus source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper studies observable and irrevocable commitment in bargaining. We investigate when commitment tactics can cause an impasse and when compromise is feasible. In the static model in which a player's commitment decision is made simultaneously with his choice of bargaining stance, compromise becomes unattainable (Ellingsen and Miettinen, 2008). We first analyze a static bargaining model, in which the players decide whether to attempt commitment after announcing their demands. In contrast to the aforementioned strong result, our model accommodates both incompatible commitments and compromises as equilibrium outcomes. We then extend our analysis to a dynamic setting. It is shown that compromise is possible if the players can alter their demands quickly and the chances of successful commitment are low. ? 2010 Elsevier B.V.
着者Li D.
期刊名称Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
出版年份2011
月份2
日期1
卷号77
期次2
出版社Elsevier BV
出版地Netherlands
页次20http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/3 - 211
国际标準期刊号0167-2681
电子国际标準期刊号1879-1751
语言英式英语
关键词Bargaining, Commitment, Compromise, Impasse
