Tunneling and the decision to go private: Evidence from Hong Kong
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

杜巨澜教授 (经济学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2012.10.001

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/3WOS source URL
Scopushttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/4Scopus source URL

其它资讯

摘要We examine a sample of going-private transactions in the Hong Kong stock market from 1989 to 2008. Privatized firms experienced large negative abnormal returns prior to the announcement of going private transaction, particularly in those firms with weak corporate governance structure and a high level of related party transactions. The likelihood of a firm to go private is high in those poorly governed firms with large free cash flow. Our evidence suggests that controlling shareholders carry out self-dealings that lead to value losses and depressed stock prices. When remaining public is no longer attractive, controlling shareholders take the firm private by paying a relatively low premium to minority shareholders. ? 2012 Elsevier B.V.

着者Du J., He Q., Yuen S.W.
期刊名称Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
出版年份201http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/3
月份http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/4
日期1
卷号22
期次1
出版社Elsevier BV
出版地Netherlands
页次50 - 68
国际标準期刊号0927-5http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/38X
电子国际标準期刊号1879-0585
语言英式英语

关键词Free cash flow, Going private, Related party transactions, Tunneling