Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 锺剑修教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.002 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1WOS source URL
Scopushttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1Scopus source URL
其它资讯
摘要We model countersignaling (i.e., very high types refraining from signaling) arising from the tradeoff between persuasion and learning in a signaling game. We assume that the agent has imperfect private information regarding his/her productivity, which the signaling action provides additional verifiable information about. A higher-type agent benefits more from providing such objective, albeit imprecise, "proof" for the market, but may also gain less from learning about his/her productivity. When the latter effect dominates the former for the very high types, the equilibrium exhibits countersignaling: very high and low types pool on refraining from signaling, and only the medium types signal. Under certain conditions, the countersignaling equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium. ? 20http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/13 Elsevier B.V.
着者Chung K.-S., Esodouble acute P.
期刊名称Economics Letters
出版年份20http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/13
月份http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/12
日期http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
卷号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/12http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
期次3
出版社Elsevier BV
出版地Netherlands
页次487 - 49http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
国际标準期刊号0http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/165-http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1765
电子国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1873-7374
语言英式英语
关键词Countersignaling, Learning, Persuasion, Signaling
