Entry, reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

车嘉华教授 (经济学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/caje.12104

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0WOS source URL

其它资讯

摘要We examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U-shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.

着者Che JH, Qiu L, Zhou W
期刊名称Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d'économique
出版年份2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/014
月份11
日期1
卷号47
期次4
出版社Wiley: 24 months
页次1256 - 1281
国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/08-4http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/085
电子国际标準期刊号154http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0-5982
语言英式英语

Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics