Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李多哲教授 (经济学系) |
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引用次数
Scopushttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2Scopus source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper studies the three-player sequential bargaining game with a simple majority voting rule due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We show that there is a vast multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs, and that as the discount factor tends to one, the set of equilibrium payoffs evolves monotonically towards the entire feasible set. The multiplicity result can be easily extended to an interesting variant of the bargaining game, in which the responders only observe their own offers.
着者Li D.
期刊名称Economics Bulletin
出版年份http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2014
月份1
日期1
卷号34
期次http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2
出版社Economics Bulletin
出版地United States
页次11http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2 - 113http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/2
国际标準期刊号1545-http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/29http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/21
语言英式英语
关键词Majority voting, Multilateral bargaining, Multiple equilibria
