Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 郎咸平教授 (金融学系) |
| 方伟明教授 (金融学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.12.002 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/42WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要Prior studies, such as Claessens et al.'s [Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholding. Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2771], suggest that deviation between ultimate control and ownership decreases firm value (due to the entrenchment effects of large shareholding). Using a sample of Canadian firms, we study the relation of ultimate control and ownership with an important dimension of stock liquidity - bid - ask spread. We find that stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component of their bid-ask spread and wider bid-ask spread. Our results are consistent with the notion that the ultimate owners of these stocks may have selfish agendas. To increase the probability of the agendas being implemented, the firms may have poor information disclosure, resulting in poor stock liquidity. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Attig N, Fong WM, Gadhoum Y, Lang LHP
期刊名称Journal of Banking and Finance
出版年份2006
月份10
日期1
卷号30
期次10
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
页次2875 - 2892
国际标準期刊号0378-http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/4266
电子国际标準期刊号1872-6372
语言英式英语
关键词bid-ask spread; Canada; ultimate control and ownership
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS
