姓名：TimothyPerrine


性别：男


职称：特聘副研究员


所在学科：哲学

办公室：B437


接待日时间：周一下午4:45——6:45


邮箱地址：timperrine@gmail.com


简 介

Education
Ph.D., Philosophy, Indiana University (June 2017)
Minor: History and Philosophy of Science
B.A., Philosophy, Calvin College (May 2010)
Positions
Assistant Professor, School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
(September 2020-Present)
Post-doctoral Researcher, School of Philosophy, Wuhan University , Wuhan, China (August 2018-August 2020)
Areas of Specialization and Competence
AOS: Epistemology, Axiology, Ethics
AOC: Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics
Current Book Project:
The Epistemic Value of Accurate Representation.
When I was in high school, my mother co-authored a college textbook in biology. During this process, she received numerous proofs of the textbook chapters in the mail. The proofs had various sentences, but also pictures, charts, images, models, diagrams, etc. She spent time late at night going line-by-line correcting the sentences. But she also corrected, modified, and improved upon the other representations as well. I believe my mother was right to correct not just the sentences in her textbook but the other representations as well. There is something valuable and important in accurately representing the world, whether it is in the form of a sentence or something else. This book project is an attempt to more carefully and rigorously develop that idea.
Publications
Peer-Reviewed Articles and Book Chapters
(1)“A Challenge to the New Metaphysics: Priority Theory, deRosset, and Explanation” (co-authored with David Fisher and Hao Hong), Synthese, forthcoming.
(2)“Arithmetic, Logicism, and Frege’s Definitions,” International Philosophical Quarterly. Forthcoming.
(3)“Consequentialism, Animal Ethics, and the Value of Valuing,” Journal of Applied Value, 37.3 (2020): 485-501.
(4)“Strong Internalism, Doxastic Involuntarism, and the Costs of Compatibilism,” Synthese, 197.7 (2020): 3171-3191.
(5)“On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism,” Logos & Episteme, 11.1 (2020): 77-96.
(6)“Hsiao on the Moral Status of Animals,” Journal of Agriculture and Environmental Ethics. 32.5-6. (2019). 927-33.
(7)“Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth,” Acta Analytica. 34.4 (2019): 515-29.
(8)“Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil,” Sophia. 58.2 (2019): 115-135.
(9)“Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21.4 (2018): 979-996.
(10)“Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession,” Logos & Episteme. 9.4 (2018): 433-449.
(11)“Justification, Justifying, and Leite’s Localism,” Acta Analytica, 33.4 (2018): 505-524.
(12)“Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties,” with Luis R. G. Oliveira. European Journal of Philosophy, 25.2 (2017): 1021-38.
(13)“Skeptical Theism,” with Stephen J. Wykstra, in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, eds. Paul Moser and Chad Meister. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 85-107.
(14)“Undermining Truthmaker Theory.” Synthese. 192.1 (2015): 185-200.
(15)“A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’.” Sophia. 54.1 (2015): 35-43.
(16)“Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge.” Logos and Episteme. 5.3 (2014): 351-60.
(17)“In Defense of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Synthese. 191.14 (2014): 3227-3237.
(18)“Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning,” with Stephen J. Wykstra, in Skeptical Theism: New Essays, ed. Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 142-163.
(19)“Envy and Its Discontents,” with Kevin Timpe, in Virtues and Their Vices, ed. Craig A. Boyd and Kevin Timpe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 225-244
(20)“The Foundations of Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and Conditional Probabilities,” with Stephen J. Wykstra. Faith and Philosophy. 29.4 (2012): 37599.
(21)“Envy and Self-worth: Amending Aquinas’ Definition of Envy.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 85:3 (2011): 433-46.
Reviews and Notes
(1)Book review of Gregory Mellema’s Complicity and Moral Accountability(University of Notre Dame, 2016) Journal of Moral Philosophy, (2019). 16 (2): 243-246.
(2)Book note on Jonathan Lear’s A Case for Irony, (Harvard University Press, 2011), The Review of Metaphysics. 66.1 (2012): 155-6.
(3)Book review, with Stephen J. Wykstra, of John Schellenberg’s The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism (Cornell University Press, 2008) in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Published online on 07.16.08.
Teaching
IU = Indiana University; WHU = Wuhan University; * = Writing intensive seminar
(1)Introduction to Philosophy (IU 14FA)
(2)Introduction to Ethics (IU 12FA, 13SP)
(3)Introduction to Symbolic Logic (IU, 14SP)
(4)Applied Ethics* (WHU 20FA)
(5)Ethics (WHU 20FA)
(6)Symbolic Logic (IU, 13SU)
(7)Metaphysics (WHU 19SP)
(8)Epistemology (WHU 19SP, co-taught with Ye Ru)
(9)Philosophy of Mind (WHU 20SP)
(10)Contemporary Philosophical Issues on Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice* (WHU 19FA, 20SP)