摘要:现有的对于Piccolo算法的安全性分析结果中，除Biclique分析外，以低于穷举搜索的复杂度最长仅攻击至14轮Piccolo-80和18轮Piccolo-128算法.通过分析Piccolo算法密钥扩展的信息泄漏规律，结合算法等效结构，利用相关密钥-不可能差分分析方法，基于分割攻击思想，分别给出了15轮Piccolo-80和21轮Piccolo-128含前向白化密钥的攻击结果.当选择相关密钥量为2⁸时，攻击所需的数据复杂度分别为2^58.6和2^62.3，存储复杂度分别为2^60.6和2^64.3，计算复杂度分别为2⁷⁸和2^82.5；在选择相关密钥量为2⁴时，攻击所需的数据复杂度均为2^62.6和2^62.3，存储复杂度分别为2^64.6和2^64.3，计算复杂度分别为2^77.93和2^124.45.分析结果表明，仅含前向白化密钥的15轮Piccolo-80算法和21轮Piccolo-128算法在相关密钥-不可能差分攻击下是不安全的.



Abstract:The existing security analysis results for Piccolo attack only up to 14-round Piccolo-80 and 18-round Piccolo-128 with lower complexity than exhaustive analysis, except for biclique analysis. By analyzing the information disclosure law of the key-schedule algorithm of Piccolo, the related-key impossible differential cryptanalysis method is used to give the attack results on 15-round Piccolo-80 and 21-round Piccolo-128 with pre-whitening keys respectively. When 2⁸ related-keys are used, the data complexity of the attack is 2^58.6 and 2^62.3, the memory complexity is 2^60.6 and 2^64.3, and the computational complexity is 2⁷⁸ and 2^82.5 respectively. When 2⁴ related-keys are used, the data complexity, memory complexity, and computational complexity of attack are 2^62.6, 2^62.3; 2^64.6, 2^64.3; 2^77.93, 2^124.45 respectively. The analysis shows that the 15-round Piccolo-80 and 21-round Piccolo-128 with pre-whitening keys are insecure under the related-key impossible differential attack.



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