主题：Understanding Diffusion of Responsibility in Anti-social Behaviors
主讲人：美国阿肯色大学 郝丽助理教授
主持人：经济与管理研究院 梁平汉副教授
时间：1月4日（星期一）下午2:00-3:30
地点：格致楼811会议室
主办单位：财税学院、实验经济学实验室、科研处
主讲人简介：
郝丽，美国阿肯色大学沃尔顿商学院经济学助理教授，美国乔治梅森大学经济学博士（2011年），研究应用微观经济学，实验经济学，行为经济学，非参数统计等。论文发表在Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization等国际一流学术期刊上。
内容摘要：
We study how the presence of a second sender affects the tendency of sending anti-social offers to the receiver, in a modified sender-receiver game where messages are delivered in person (2-player vs. 3-player games). There are two opposing effects: looking good and generous in front of a peer promotes pro-social behavior, while the diffusion of responsibility effect increases anti-social behavior. We find that the diffusion of responsibility is the dominating factor, as anti-social behavior is significantly higher when a second sender is present in both contexts: the unethical message is deceptive (Hoodwink treatment), or is honest but unfavorable to the receiver (Bitter Pill treatment). Furthermore, we elicited both senders’ reservation prices for sending the anti-social message independently via strategy method, so our result identifies that the diffusion of responsibility effect can be driven from the presence of the second sender alone, and not necessarily through market interactions (i.e. free-form negotiations, double auctions) between senders. Finally, senders’ own normative beliefs on the acceptability of the anti-social offers are predictive of the difference in their anti-social decisions between 2-player and 3-player games; senders’ second-order beliefs on receiver’s own prediction of receiving anti-social offers is highly significant in explaining individual differences in their adoption of anti-social behavior.
