主题：Nash demand game with endogenous continuation probability
主讲人：上海财经大学经济学院 荣康副教授
主持人：西南财经大学经济与管理研究院 陈晓光教授
时间：2015年12月4日（周五）下午14:00—16:00
地点：西南财经大学颐德楼H513
主办单位：经济与管理研究院 科研处
主讲人简介：
荣康，副教授，上海财经大学经济学院，2012年毕业于UIUC， USA获得博士学位。研究领域微观经济学、博弈论、机制设计、实验经济学等。研究成果发表于Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, Games and Economic Behavior等。
内容提要：
We introduce a new variation on the Nash demand game (NDG). As is the case in the original NDG, if players’ demands are compatible, each player receives his demand. If players’ demands are not jointly feasible, the game continues with probability p; thus, it terminates with probability (1-p), in which case players receive zero payoffs. If the game continues, each player’s proposal is selected at random with equal probabilities. The continuation probability is endogenous, however. This probability increases in the proximity of the demands to each other. There are many different ways to generate such an endogenous contination probability (ECP). We show that if an ECP (i) possesses certain properties, and (ii) is such that it tends to zero even when demands are very close, all equilibrium outcomes of NDG converge to the Nash solution outcome. We also consider a variant of our NDG in which each player’s proposal is still selected at random but with unequal probabilities if the game continues. We then link the equilibrium outcomes of this setup to asymmetric Nash solutions.
