主 题：众包竞赛参与者的损失规避研究
主讲人：西南财经大学经济信息工程学院 郑海超副教授
主持人：西南财经大学经济信息工程学院 王鹏副教授
时 间：2015年11月24日上午10：00~11：30
地 点：经世楼B204
主办单位：经济信息工程学院 科研处
主讲人简介：
郑海超，副教授，南开大学商学院博士，主持国家自然科学基金项目和教育部人文社科项目各1项，国家社科重点项目的子课题负责人，并主研参与了国家社科、自科项目和创新团队项目等多个项目。
主要研究领域：互联网金融，包括大众筹资、P2P借贷等；服务业电子商务、在线虚拟社区、信息技术采纳与用户行为等。近几年在国内外学术期刊发表论文十多篇，主要包括Information & Management，Journal of Global Information Management，Nankai Business Review International，International Journal of Electronic Commerce，管理学报，科研管理，管理评论等期刊。
内容提要：
Crowdsourcing contests are an effective means for firms to outsource tasks to a large group of solvers online to obtain creative solutions. Contest design is important for the performance and final outcomes of a crowdsourcing task. This study investigates contest design with loss aversion of the solvers. An experiment was conducted to study loss aversion in a crowdsourcing contest. Reversed loss aversion was identified from the experiment. In addition, the results suggested that the effect of loss on feeling is greater for expertise-based contests than for ideation contests. We then investigated the effects of reversed loss aversion on solvers’ effort level and contest reward from a game theory perspective. The solutions of game theory showed that in the setting of reversed loss aversion the solvers’ effort is greater than that in the contest without loss aversion, while the reward for the optimal solution remains the same. These theoretical findings also provided implications for contests sponsors, crowdsourcing platforms, and solvers. The sponsor should conduct contests to solve small ideation problems in which the solvers’ reactions to loss are not very intensive. As for solvers, they could adjust their participation decisions and efforts levels to avoid experiencing potential sadness in case of failures and to maximize their expected utility. Besides, diverse models should be developed by crowdsourcing platforms to match solvers and different crowdsourcing tasks.
