主讲人：台湾“中央研究院” 杨春雷研究员
主题： Voluntary Separation as a Sanctioning Device for Eternal Cooperation?
Reconciling Theory and Evidence
主持人：经济与管理研究院 梁平汉副教授
时间：10月19日（星期一）下午2:00——3:30
地点：格致楼1211会议室
主办单位：实验经济学实验室、财税学院、科研处
摘要:
How do partners elicit and achieve long-term cooperation when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate the relationship? In this paper, we first employ a laboratory experiment to investigate how cooperation comes about in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (VSRPD). We observe behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with out-for-tat often assumed in the literature (Eeckhout, 2006; Fugiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fugiwara, 2009; Rob and Yang, 2010). In our experiment, most players prefer to stay with their defecting partners and then retaliate in the following period(s). We propose a proposition called Pro-Partnership Proposition as well as a new class of equilibria called CD-Indifferent Equilibrium to explain how eternal cooperation can be achieved with these behavioral traits observed in the lab. Tests using root-mean-squared deviations suggest that our theory of VSRPD fit the data significantly better than all the strategies discussed in the literature.
主讲人简介：
杨春雷，德国多特蒙德大学经济学博士，1997年加入台湾“中央研究院”，2007年起担任研究员。主要研究微观经济学、博弈论、实验经济学，在Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, European Economic Review等国际权威学术期刊发表论文20余篇。是世界一流的实验经济学研究者。
