主题： To Join or Not to Join: The Role of Information Structures in a Threshold Game
主讲人： Dr. Bo CHEN
主持人： 杨海涛 教授
时间：2015年7月1日 下午14:30
地点： 颐德楼H502
主办单位： 科研处 经济学院
主讲人简介：
Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, 05/2014-Present (Assistant Professor, 07/2007 – 05/2014);
Ph.D. (Economics) University of Wisconsin – Madison, May 2007
(Larry Samuelson (Chair), Johanna Hertel, Bill Sandholm)
BS (HUST, China), MA (Arkansas, Wisconsin).
主要内容：
We analyze a multi-agent binary decision problem with a tipping point in the presence of imperfect information and where individual agents have ordinal preferences. An information structure summarizes what each agent can observe before making her decision. Focusing on information structures where only aggregate information from past history can be observed, we fully characterize information structures that can lead to various (efficient and inefficient) Nash equilibria. When individual decision making can be rationalized using a process of iterative dominance (Moulin (1979)), we derive a necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure under which one obtains a unique and efficient Nash equilibrium outcome. Our results suggest that if sufficient (and not necessarily perfect) information is available, coordination failure can be overcome without centralized intervention.
