Speaker: Heng (Henry) Chen, University of Hong Kong
Host: Wei Xiao, Associate professor, RIEM
Time: 14:30-16:00, May 29, Friday
Venue: Yide building H503, Liulin Campus
Abstract: We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, and rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and they believe collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This global game model does not admit standard monotone equilibrium but multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime.
Keywords: global game, model uncertainty, interval equilibrium, political passivity, abrupt outburst
