主 题：Board hierarchy, independent directors, and firm value: Evidence from China
主讲人：西肯塔基大学Johnny Chan教授
主持人：西南财经大学金融学院 张迎春教授
时 间：2014年6月17日（周二）上午09：30-11：00
地 点：柳林校区颐德楼H104
主办单位：金融学院、科研处
主讲人简介：
Johnny Chan is the Leon Page Chair of Finance and a University Distinguished Professor. He received his B.Soc.S degree in economics at Chinese University of Hong Kong (1984), M.A. in economics (1987), M.A. in finance (1989), and Ph.D. in finance (1990) at the University of Alabama. His teaching interests are investments and international finance. Research interests include derivative securities, mutual funds, fixed income, and measurement of intellectual contributions.
He has published more than 140 journal articles in leading finance and business journals such as Accounting and Business Research, Accounting and Finance, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Australian Accounting Review, Family Business Review, European Financial Management, Financial Management, Financial Review, International Business Review, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance, Journal of Financial Education, Journal of Financial Research, Journal of Futures Markets, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Portfolio Management, Journal of Real Estate Research, Real Estate Economics, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, among others.
He held tenured faculty positions at the University of Dayton, the University of Wisconsin-Parkside, and Minnesota State University Moorhead before he joined WKU in 2003. He is also a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) charter holder and was a director of Midwest Finance Association (2004-2007). He won the College public service award in 2007, College research award in 2005, 2008, and 2010, the Vitale Award for Innovation, Initiative, and Leadership in 2008, and awarded a University Distinguished Professor in 2013. He is currently an associate editor of Chinese Economy and Journal of Financial Education, and on editorial board of several journals.
论文摘要：
While the vast majority of US companies list their board of directors alphabetically, we observe that in the annual reports most Chinese companies list their directors in no mechanical order. We interpret the listing order of directors as board hierarchy, reflecting power allocation within the board. Based on extant evidence that independent directors contribute to firm value and that empowered individuals have more freedom to express opinions and provide input and therefore have more influence in group decisions, we expect independent director rankings to be positively associated with firm value and find such evidence. Further, we find that this association is prominent in poor-performing firms and state-owned enterprises where agency conflicts are arguably severe. Our study points out one condition under which independent directors could add more value to a firm.
